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Common Law Misappropriation in the
Digital Era
Dale P. Olson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Information is often valuable and when publicly disclosed may be difficult
to protect or control.' Such information, whether in the form of data or a product
configuration, unless it can be exploited while keeping it secret,2 is accordingly
susceptible to copying by competitors absent legal protection. The law,
however, has not provided a framework that supplements the armamentarium of
federal intellectual property law3 because the protection authorized by federal
constitutional limits also thrust works into the public domain. The evolving

technological developments which permit the effectively instantaneous
transmission of information, as well as the inexpensive copying of trade values
in products, imposes an evolving challenge in providing a balance between

protection of works and overprotection of works. The technologically evolving
nature of intellectual property protection was the impetus for the Digital

Millennium Copyright Act,4 dealing with a variety of issues that have become
more pressing as a result of technological developments.' Central to the overall

* © 1999. Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., 1969, J.D. 1972,
University of Minnesota. LL.M., 1976, Yale University.
1. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (release of trade
secret information requires due process protection to protect value inherent in
information).
2. See infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") has a number
of provisions; two of these provisions add chapters to Title 17 of the U.S. Code providing
copyright protection including boat hull design protection and copyright protection
systems. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.), Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) has two major provisions:
Title I extends the copyright term, 17 U.S.C. § 301(c), an additional 20 years and Title
II, subtitled the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998," provides a partial exemption
to the public performance right for music which is broadcast. Another recently enacted
statute, the No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997)
(codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. 2311), provided that criminal sanctions apply to
willful infringement even when there is no financial gain, the objective of the statute
being to overrule United States v. LaMaccia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994). State
efforts to add protection by statute were abrogated in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), discussed infra notes 367-72 and accompanying text.
5. The DMCA also contains a partial and temporary resolution of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Bonito Boats, discussed infra note 374 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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equation concerning protection (and the denial of protection) is the fact that the
issues arise in an ever-changing technological environment. Put simply, "[u]ses
of computer technology-such as digitization-and communications
technology-such as fiber optic cable-have had an enormous impact on the
creation, reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works." 6

A. The Value ofInformation
The value of information was recognized in early cases providing
protection for information transmitted by wire7 and ajudicial recognition that the
collection and timely distribution of information had value. More recently, the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Carpenterv. UnitedStates' provides
an illustration ofthe value of the control of information. In Carpenter,a reporter
for the Wall Street Journal who wrote a column involving subjective evaluations

6. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (1985) (hereinafter NII). Digital technology has played a significant
role in this transformation as well since a "digitized" work-"i.e., [a work] translated into
a digital code (usually a series of zeroes and ones) ... can then be stored and used in that
digital form. This dramatically increases: the ease and speed with which a work can be
reproduced; the quality of copies (both the first and the hundredth "generation" are
virtually identical); ... and the speed with which copies (authorized and unauthorized)
can be "delivered" to the public." Id. at 12.
7. The "ticker cases" are discussed infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
8. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). Carpenterinvolved both mail and wire fraud convictions,
which were unanimously affirmed by the Court, and a separate securities law conviction
of a Wall Street Journal reporter and a stockbroker on a "misappropriation" theory of
liability for the reporter's breach of confidentiality owed to the Journal as his employer.
The securities law conviction was affirmed by an equally divided court. The reporter's
breach of confidentiality formed the basis for the charge of fraud in the purchase or sale
of security in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1994) and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. A detailed discussion of the misappropriation theory is
contained in UnitedStates v. Carpenter,791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). See also FMC
Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 990 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[c]onfidential business
information, even though intangible in nature, is corporate property"); cf United States
v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). O'Hagan adopted the "misappropriation theory" for
imposing insider trading liability in a case where a lawyer, with knowledge of an
impending tender offer, used it to purchase securities which resulted, after the public
announcement of tender offer, in a profit of $4.3 million. The Supreme Court held:
Under [the misappropriation theory], a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a violation of a duty
of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the 'exclusive use of that
information." Id. at 652. The Court stated further that "the fiduciary's fraud is
consummated... when, without disclose to his principal, he used the information to
purchase or sell securities." Id. at 655.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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of companies used his knowledge of the publication dates of columns he wrote

to trade in the stocks of subject companies. This trading activity was in direct
violation of a company policy that labeled all information obtained from
reporting activities "company property."9 The Supreme Court stated:
Confidential business information has long been recognized as
property.... The [Wall Street] Journal had a property right in keeping
confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the
schedule and contents of the [reporter's] column[s]. .

. The

confidential information was generated from the business, and the
business had a right to decide how to use it prior to disclosing it to the
public. Petitioners cannot successfully contend.., that a scheme to
defraud requires a monetary loss, such as giving the information to a
competitor; it is sufficient that the Journal has been deprived of its
right to exclusive use of the information, for exclusivity is an
important aspect of confidential business information and most private
property for that matter. 10
Property is properly understood as having a broad definition. As the
Supreme Court recognized, there is no imposed link between economic value
and the existence of a property right for purposes of defining property. In
Phillipsv. Washington Legal Foundation,' the Court identified the constellation
of qualities that inhere in a property label:
We have never held that a physical item is not "property" simply
because it lacks a positive economic or market value . .. Our
conclusion in this regard was premised on our longstanding
recognition that property is more than economic value; it also consists
of "the group of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his
dominion of the physical thing" such "as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it." While the interest income at issue here may have no

9. The corporate policy violated by Winans stated:
First and foremost, all material gleaned by you in the course of your work for
Dow Jones is deemed to be strictly the Company's property. This includes
not only the fiuits of your own and your colleagues' work, but also
information on plans for running items and articles on particular companies
and industries and advertising schedules in future issues. Such material must
never be disclosed to anyone outside the Company, including friends and
relatives.
Brief for the United States at 3, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (No. 86422).

10. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
11. 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1933 (1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and
disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property."
This expansive definition provides a background for approaching the
disclosure of information and trade values and the conceptual framework within
which the assessment concerning protection takes place.
B. An Introduction to the MisappropriationofDisclosed Trade Values
The value of information, whether framed in terms of business conditions,
customers, facts, or a product configuration, is the basis for the two premises
which underlie the protection of publicly disclosed trade values. The express
premise inherent in the doctrine of misappropriation of publicly disclosed trade
values is a branch of the law of unfair competition. Unfair competition, in turn,
is better known for the branch containing the law of trademarks. The implied
premise recognizes that misappropriation, as distinct from trademarks, involves
the appropriation and use by the defendant 3 of a unique pecuniary interest which
has been created by the plaintiff through the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money. 14
The doctrine of misappropriation has been variously defined. In United
States Golf Association v. St. Andrews System, 5 misappropriation was
summarized as a doctrine which has been
[A]pplied to a variety of situations in which the courts have sensed
that one party was dealing "unfairly" with another, but which were not
covered by the three established statutory systems protecting
intellectual property: copyright, patent, and trademark/deception as to
origin. 6
Misappropriation has also been defined as the "taking and use of another's
property for the sole purpose of capitalizing unfairly on the good will and

12. Id. at 1933 (internal citations omitted).
13. Some cases define the requirements of the cause of action to include the
existence of actual competition between the plaintiff and the defendant.
14. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1162, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
15. 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1984). Misappropriation has also been
defined as "general intellectual property." Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 722
F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985). This is a definition which indicates the difficulties
inherent in providing a competent generalization in the form of a definition about a type
of protection which is effectively appears in variant forms and has effectively been
defined by the preemption of state attempts to provide protection rather than by its
affirmative qualities.
-16. UnitedStates Gol, 749 F.2d at 1034-35.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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reputation of the property owner. '17 Additionally, some cases define the cause
of action to require the existence of actual competition between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
The Supreme Court created the doctrine of misappropriation of publicly
disclosed trade values in InternationalNews Service v. AssociatedPress,8 a case
in which a news service misappropriated news generated by its competitor. But
the fluid dimensions of misappropriation have made it-and continue to make
it-an attractive doctrine for protecting intellectual property that qualifies neither
for statutory protection based on copyright or patents, nor for traditional unfair
competition protection based on confusion of source. "
However, the same considerations which make misappropriation so
attractive a doctrine for protecting publicly disclosed trade values also give rise
to concerns about identifying the outer bounds of misappropriation. Further,
these same considerations are present in a more direct manner in the doctrine of
federal preemption of state laws concerning intellectual property. Such
preemption ensures that restrictions imposed by state law do not interfere with
the free use of material not protected by federal copyright or patent statutes..

II. AN OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
A. An Introductionto Intellectual PropertyProtection
Critical to an understanding of the operation of the system of federal
protection is the public domain, in which a work receives no protection from
either federal copyright and patent laws or state laws. "Patent laws function only
to keep things out of the public domain temporarily. They have nothing to do
with putting things in. They say nothing about right to copy or right to use, they
speak only in terms of right to exclude."20 This aspect of patent protection was

emphasized in Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, Inc. 21 In

Leatherman, the Federal Circuit declined subject matter jurisdiction under the
patent laws2 on the ground that federal patent laws do not create an affirmative

17. Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publ'g Co., 267 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (App. Div.
1966).
18. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See infra notes 206-19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of InternationalNews Service.
19. Increasingly, the expansive dimensions of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act are
being applied to situations ofperceived commercial unfairness involving copying, in part
as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boats, which codified
the preemption doctrine in a manner foreclosing most, but not all, state protection.
20. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902
n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
21. 131 F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) limits subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit to appeals which "arise under" the federal patent statute, which the Supreme
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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"right to copy" material in the public domain; rather, that "is a common law
right."' The Supreme Court has emphasized that when a patent or copyright
expires, the public's right to practice the invention or publish the work is
unrestricted, 4 subject to protections against misrepresentations of the source of
manufacture. No "special property" vests in the owner of the expired copyright
or patent.25 A work may also enter the public domain through abandonment,26
which precludes the author from seeking independent state protection for the
work. An important qualification recognizes that a work may be in the public
domain for purposes of one type of federal protection, but enjoy concurrent
protection under another federal law. In a recent copyright case disallowing
protection for simple compilations, the Supreme Court observed that
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may
be used by others without compensation [but] this is not "some
unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is rather, "the essence
of copyright," and a constitutional requirement.2

Court interpreted, in Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807

(1988), to extend "only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes
either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law,
in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims."
23. Leatherman, 131 F.3d at 1015.
24. Bonito Boat, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existing knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available.") (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)); see Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (holding that the right to use name
"Singer" by which machine known during period of patent protection accompanies right

to manufacture machine upon expiration of patent).
25. See Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co., 43 F. 450,451 (E.D. Mo. 1890); see also

Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 732 (N.D. Ill.
1883) (holding that author of
work in the public domain cannot claim additional rights to restrict publication by

advocating his pen name as a trademark or tradename: "No pseudonym, however
ingenious, novel, or quaint, can give an author any more rights than he would have under
his own name.").
26. See National Comics v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir.
1951); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958). A
recent case involving Martin Luther King's Speech, "I Have a Dream," reversed a finding
by the district court that the work had been placed in the public domain by the nature of
its initial delivery and distribution of printed copies, Estate of King v. CBS, Inc., 47

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611, 1616 (N.D. Ga. 1998), holding summary judgment
inappropriate since "[a] performance, no matter how broad the audience, is not a
publication; to hold otherwise would be to upset a long line of precedent." Estate of
King v. CBS, Inc., No. 98-9079, 1999 WL 1003629, *5(11th Cir. Nov. 5, 1999).
27. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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From this expansive definition of the public domain has emerged a strong
right to copy. Indeed, the right includes the right to copy in a commercially
effective fashion, including the use of an originator's trademark in a descriptive

fashion to identify the value of copied products.28
B. The FederalProtectionof IntellectualProperty

1. Introduction
Copyright, like patents, is derived from authority granted in the United
States Constitution. Article I, section 8, clause 8, provides:
[The Congress shall have power] [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
Because this provision was deliberated in secret, and adopted without debate, the
\ comment of James Madison in The Federalistis the best source of the reasoning
reflecting the public policy interest in granting patents and copyrights:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjusted, in Great Britain, to be a right
of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal

(internal citations omitted); see also Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing the "delicate equilibrium" in copyright law between
appropriate incentives and excessive protection, concluding that "courts must always
keep this symmetry in mind").
28. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[b]ecause a trademark is an identifier rather than a property 'right,' the use
of a competitor's mark that does not cause confusion as to the source is permissible");
see also Saxony Prods., Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1975)
(allowing use of perfume name to identify equivalent fragrance so long as the comparison
is accurate, and no confusion as to the source of the copied fragrance exists).

Early authorities in the field of unfair competition similarly held it was not unfair
competition to compete effectively with an established product by copying the
configuration of the product. See, e.g., Jessar Mfg. Corp. v. Berlin, 110 A.2d 396, 401
(Pa. 1955); De Long Hook & Eye Co. v. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co., 130 N.E. 765, 767 (Ill.
1921). See also Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. United States Expansion Bolt Co., 164
N.Y.S. 433, 440 (App. Div. 1917) (stating that "[lt is not the policy of the law to permit
a manufacturer, under the guise of preventing unfair competition, to establish without any
patent, a perpetual monopoly in the production of any article in common use; it certainly
will not assist him to monopolize the most economical, sensible, and efficient form in
which the devices themselves may be embodied and offered to the trade").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in
both cases with claims of individuals.2 9
The Supreme Court has stated the economic philosophy behind the
empowerment of protection for copyrights and patents:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort b , personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.3"
Finally, the constitutional provision authorizing patent and copyright
protection has also directed the nationalscope of federal protection of patents
and copyrights. 3' This provision restricts states' right to limit access to materials
that the federal scheme has left unprotected.
2. Copyright Protection
a. Common Law Copyright
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, common law or state copyright law
accorded the copyright owner a right of first publication.3 2 A common law
copyright arose upon the creation of a work and existed until the work was
published.33 This was deemed, by operation of law, to serve as a public
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1937).
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954). Similar statements have been made
in many other cases. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
531, 560 (1985); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990);
In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
31. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) ("The objective of
the Copyright Clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of rights national in scope.");
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) (stating that the goal
of the federal scheme of protection is "to have national uniformity in patent and
copyright laws"). See also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604
F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979). In Mitchell Bros., the national scope of copyright
protection was used as a ground to foreclose a morality, or obscenity standard being
imposed as a condition of copyright protection.
32. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (holding that the Copyright Act of 1976
extends "copyright to all works from the time of their creation"). If the infringing act did
not occur until after the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, the federal courts
have exclusive subject matterjurisdiction of the action. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994). See,
e.g., Van Dusen v. Southeast Fla. Nat'l Bank, 478 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
33. See, e.g., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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dedication of the work.34 However, the Copyright Act of 1976 changed the
demarcation line between common law and statutory copyright law and
significantly constricted common law copyright.
Even before the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, common law
copyright was not unlimited; common law copyright did not provide protection
against "idea snatching" from an unpublished manuscript.3 1 In Fendler v.
Morosco,36 the New York Court of Appeals outlined the requirements for
proving infringement of a common law copyright:
The literary larcenist must do more than filch ideas, imitate
mannerisms, repeat information, borrow phrases, utilize quotations;
you must be able to attribute to him the felonious intention of
appropriating
without independent labour a material part of a protected
37
work.

b. Moral Rights
Although the accession by the United States to the Berne Convention38
required the protection of moral, or noneconomic rights, of authors, the
minimalist approach to Berne accession relied upon the existing state protection
of authors' rights, rights which are also recognized in Section 43(a) of the

Bimbaum v. United States, 558 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968).
In contrast, the common law did not include any similar right by which an inventor
could exclude others from the manufacture or use of an invention. See Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1972).

34. In Estate ofKing v. CBS, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611 (N.D. Ga. 1993) a
general publication was found from a combination of unrestricted broadcast rights with
widespread dissemination of the speech: "I Have a Dream." This case was, however,
recently reversed. See Estate of King v. CBS, Inc., No. 98-9079, 1999 WL 1003629, *5
(1lth Cir. Nov. 5, 1999).
35. See, e.g., Turner v. Century House Publ'g Co., 290 N.Y.S.2d 637, 644 (1968).

See also Cantor v. Mankiewicz, 203 N.Y.S.2d 626 (App. Term. 1960); Hewitt v. Coward,
45 N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Term. 1948).
If the idea is submitted in circumstances which reflect an expectation of payment,
and other conditions governing recovery are met, a separate body of equitable principles
may permit recovery. See infra note notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
36. 171 N.E. 60 (N.Y. 1930).
37. Id. (quoting AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKs 169-70

(1899)).
38. The Beme Convention also required an enhanced protection of architectural
works and modified the registration requirements for copyrighted works. See Pub. L. No.
100-568, § 4(a), § 9, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Lanham Act.39

The provision of the Copyright Act which provides an

affirmative statement of moral rights, the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990,40

provides for rights independent of the rights inherent in copyright and "[b]ecause
they are personal to the artist, moral rights exist independently of an artist's
copyright in his or her work" and protect attribution and integrity.41
In turn, state protection may supplement these federal protections. The
importance of the New York Artist's Authorship Rights Act as an independent
basis for relief, separate from the copyright laws, was illustrated in Wojnarowicz
v. American Family Association," where the defendant, an opponent of

continuing federal funding of the National Endowment of the Arts, prepared a
pamphlet containing fragments of images taken from collage-like paintings,
selecting some images with homoerotic themes. 43 The defendant distributed six
thousand of the pamphlets containing fourteen selections from the plaintiffs
work, under the heading "Your Tax Dollars Helped Pay for These 'Works of
Art." '44 The plaintiff brought an action claiming copyright infringement
as well
45
as violation of the New York Artist's Authorship Rights Act.

39. The history of this provision is outlined in Carterv. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71
F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995), in which the court stated:
Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 and sidestepped the difficult question of protecting moral rights. It declared the Berne
Convention is not self-executing, existing law satisfied the United States'
obligations in adhering to the Convention, its provisions are not enforceable
through any action brought pursuant to the Convention itself, and neither
adherence to the Convention nor the implementing legislation expands or
reduces any rights under federal, state, or common law to claim authorship of
a work or to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of a
work.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
41. In Carter,the court defined the right of the attribution as the right of the artist
to be recognized as the creator of a work or to publish anonymously as well as the right
to prevent false attributions, and defined the right of integrity to prevent "deforming or
mutilating" changes to a work. Carter,71 F.3d at 81. The Second Circuit did not apply
a third right accorded to works of visual art of "recognized stature" to prevent destruction
finding the work at issue to be a work for hire.
42. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
43. Id. at 133-34.
44. Id. at 134.
45. Id. at 132-33.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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Although the court declined relief under an expansive view of fair use,46
relief was granted under the New York Artist's Authorship Rights Act.47
Finding that the Act was not preempted by federal copyright law because the
statute differed in its objectives, and that the requirements for stating a cause of
action were separate from copyright law, the court granted a preliminary
injunction preventing continued distribution of the pamphlet. The court stated
that so long as a legend was included sufficient to warn viewers ofthe nature of
the editing, "such pamphlets or materials [would] not suggest to reasonable
readers that a fragment of one of plaintiff's art works constitutes the complete
48
work.
c. Copyright Act of 1976
The subject matter of copyright is broad49 and the requirements for
obtaining protection minimal." Copyright law grants a series of exclusive
rights5' that last for an extended period of time. Those rights, delineated in
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976, allow the copyright owner to control
the work. 2 In turn, infringement occurs only when a copyrighted work is used
"in one of the five ways set forth in the statute 53 and if original elements of the

46. Id. at 142-47. Fair use, provided for in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), is a statutory
codification of the fair use doctrine. See infra note 51. In this context, the court
considered an expanded fair use defense justified by the plaintiff's acceptance of public
funding for his work, and the defendant's motivation of defeating federal funding for the
National Endowment for the Arts.
47. Id. at 134-41; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (Consol. 1990).
48. Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 149.
49. The Copyright Act also contains separate provisions protecting computer chips
from architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 907 (1994).
50. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, for example, computer programs are
classified as "literary works" as are books. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo,
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
51. These exclusive rights are subject to a series of exceptions and compulsory
licenses. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-19 (1994). Perhaps the most significant is fair use, a
"privilege in someone other than the owner of the a copyright to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly
granted to the owner." Fair use is now codified in Section 107. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994).
52. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990). In Stewart, the Court stated:
"An author holds a bundle of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, among them the
right to copy and the right to incorporate the work into derivative works." The Court
firther stated that nothing in the copyright statutes would prevent an author from
hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright." Id. at 228-29.
53. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,433 (1984); see also
Frasier v. Adams-Sandler, Inc., 94 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant
who withheld photographic images from the plaintiff did not intrude on the rights
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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work are copied. 4 Copyright law covers all original works fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.5 5 The Copyright Act of 1976 also contains significant
limitations on copyright protection. Importantly, ideas, as opposed
to the
5 6
expression in which ideas are embedded, receive no protection.
Copyright protection requires compliance with minimal requirements.
While originality is the sine qua non of copyright,57 the standard for originality
is modest.58 Compilations of facts,5 9 including directories, caused courts
applying the originality test problems. In Feist v. Rural Telephone,6 the
Supreme Court solved these problems by holding that a simple investment of
time and money is insufficient to satisfy the originality test.6' This decision has

accorded a copyright owner and that the plaintiff's claim was not actionable under the
copyright statute).
54. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1996). To constitute
infringement, copying must have occurred; in turn, that requires proof of access to the
work which is claimed to have been copied and that the work was in fact copied; "if
independent creation results in an identical work, the creator of that work is free to sell
it." Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997); accord
Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
55. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-34, 1239 (3d
Cir. 1986) (computer program copyright includes structure of program as well as
underlying code generating program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (computer operating
system within subject matter of copyright); Building Officials & Code Adm. v. Code
Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (rule of "free access" forecloses copyright
in legal authorities).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." This provision, in turn,
emanates from Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), a case which has a continuing role
in shaping the dimensions of copyright protection. See Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy
Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REv. 604 (1998); see also Miller v. Universal
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing that the idea/expression
dichotomy "cannot be maintained if research is held to be copyrightable").
57. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981).
58. If the originality requirement is met, a work is entitled to copyright protection
even if an identical work is in the public domain. See United States v. Hamilton, 583
F.2d 448, 451 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978). If a copyright is claimed as a derivative work, based
on an existing work including a work in the public domain, the test requires the work
demonstrate "a distinguishable variation that is more than merely trivial." Waldman Pub.
Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994).
59. A compilation may also exist in the assembly of text and visual elements, such
as in a label. See Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir.
1963).
60. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
61. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860
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effectively foreclosed protectin for many compilations6 2 and other types of
databases,63 as well works that combine simple elements. 6
Copyright is not limited to infringement of the literal elements of the
protected work but also extends to the "total concept and feel" of the work. This
approach protects works in which literal infringement is avoided but the essence
of a work is copied.65 The significance of this approach has been most apparent
in cases involving greeting cards, and potentially has the most impact in
computer applications programs. For example, in Hartfford House, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc.,66 the Tenth Circuit utilized an expansive approach
according copyright protection to a distinctive line of greeting cards. The court
found that copyright laws were violated when the elements making the cards
distinctive were copied. The effect of such a broad holding affords protection
with significant commercial significance.
The depth of copyright protection, in practical terms, is also reflected in the
remedy provisions of the Copyright Act. In addition to actual damages, the
Copyright Act of 1976 provides for the recovery of minimum, statutory
damages. Statutory damages range from a minimum of $250 per infringement
to a maximum of $100,000 per infringement.67 In cases of multiple
infringements,
each infringement may constitute the basis for a separate damage
68
award.

(5th Cir. 1979). In Mitchell Bros., the court, in declining to evaluate a work for obscene
content, observed that "[t]he all-inclusive nature of the 1909 Act reflects the policy
judgment that encouraging the product of wheat also requires the protection of a good
deal of chaff." Id. at 860.
62. CompareKey Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945
F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (permitting a differently organized second directory to be
compiled from information in a source directory) with Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736
F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that copying a selection of information and an
arrangement constituted copyright infringement).
63. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674,680-89 (2d
Cir. 1998) (permitting publication of national reporter system cases if original editorial
elements were excluded from competing publisher's products).
64. See, e.g., Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25 (lst Cir. 1998) (holding T-shirt
slogan with stock drawings not protected).
65. McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987); Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
66. 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1994). The district court is awarded wide latitude in
assessing statutory damages, which need not bear any relationship to actual damages
suffered. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232

(1952).
68. See Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (affirming a district court award of $4 million
in statutory damages, calculated by allowing the statutory maximum of $50,000 per
infringement multiplied by the 80 wilful infringements found by the district court). The
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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3. Patents
Copyrights and patents, which share a common constitutional enabling
provision, have both similarities and differences. To understand the federal
scope of protection and its impact on common law misappropriation, the most
appropriate starting point is Justice Holmes's statement that "[a] patent is
property carried to the highest degree of abstraction-a right in rem to exclude,
without physical object or content." Phrased differently, "patent rights are rights
to 'exclude others"' 69 from practicing the invention." Infringement of a patent
occurs when:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor.7
The subject matter of patents is expansive; the Supreme Court has described
patent protection as extending to "anything under the sun that is made by man."
Recently, the Federal Circuit ruled that no prohibition exists to prevent the
patenting of business methods.73 The Supreme Court has identified the "law of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" as the only types of subject

statutory maximum was increased to $100,000 per infiingement effective March 1, 1989.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994). An innocent infringer, that is a defendant who
demonstrates that no reason existed to believe that his or her acts constituted copyright
infringement, is subject to a maximum statutory damage of $200. See D.C. Comics Inc.
v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29,35 (2d Cir. 1990).
69. Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 73 (1998).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) provides: "A patentee shall have remedy by civil
action for infringement of his patent."
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). Infringement may occur either by active
inducement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994), or through contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) (1994). For an explanation of the distinction between active inducement and
contributory infiingement, see Hewlett-PackardCo. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d
1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Recently, the Supreme Court severely limited the ability
to bring suit against a State as a defendant in cases involving patent and trademark
claims. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,
119 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (1999) (holding that the State enjoys sovereign immunity under
Eleventh Amendment from patent infringement action); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2221 (1999) (holding that
the State enjoys sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment from trademark
infringement action).
72. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
73. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
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matter that are unpatentable. 74 A patent must be novel, 75 useful, 76 and
nonobvious. 77 In addition, a patent must be filed within "time bar" rules that
foreclose an untimely application.78
4. Trademarks
Trademarks protect the good will79 inherent in an identifiable source and
represent the public's expectation of purchasing a product that is "a single thing
coming from a single source."8" This secondary meaning, that the trademark
identifies "not only goods, but also the source of the goods,"'" may be proved by

74. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). A mathematical algorithm
standing alone is unpatentable as an abstract idea, until it is used to produce a "useful,
concrete and tangible result." In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit stated: "Invalidity based upon lack of novelty (often called
'anticipation') requires that the same invention, including each element and limitation of
the claims, was known or used by others before it was invented by the patentee." Hoover
Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraf, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 302 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
76. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531 (1966).
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). In the leading case of Graham v. JohnDeere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), the Supreme Court identified the test for nonobviousness as:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined.
78. See Pfaffv. Wells Elects., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304, 311 (1998). InPfaff,the onsale bar condition was deemed met when the product that was the subject of the invention
was offered commercially for sale was sufficiently developed that it could have been
patented, as evidenced either by an actual reduction to practice or by a description of
sufficient specific in its disclosure to permit "a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention." Id. at 312.
79. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1520 (11th Cir.
1990) ("When an unaffiliated lodge imitates a franchise name, it is exploiting the
goodwill of that chain."); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 977
(l1th Cir. 1983) (adoption of mark close to plaintiffs mark attempt to "cash in" on
plaintiff's goodwill). See generally Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair
Competition: A CriticalHistory ofLegal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1979).
80. Burke-Parsons-Bowlry v. Appalachian Log Homes, 871 F.2d 590, 596 (6th Cir.
1989) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920)). The Supreme
Court, in Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1910), stated:
[Competitors] have a right to tell the public what they are doing, and to get
whatever share they can in the popularity [of a product] by advertising that they are
trying to make the same article and think that they can succeed.... By doing so

they are not trying to get the good will of the name, but the good will of the goods.
81. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir.
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extensive advertising. 82 Trademarks enhance competition, as a report
accompanying the federal trademark statute identified:
Trademarks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they
make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from another. Trademarks encourage the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the
good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trademarks,
therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair
competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages
of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those
who have created them to those who have not.83
There are several different kinds of marks. Generic marks are common

descriptive names for products and receive no protection." The Supreme Court
has defined generic marks as "[m]arks that constitute a common descriptive
name ....[and refer] to the genus of which the particular product is a species.""
A descriptive mark is protected only if the mark has acquired secondary
meaning,86 which permits it to identify a product or service. Suggestive marks87

1995).
82. See, e.g., Burke-Parsons-Bowiry, 871 F.2d at 596. See also William M.
Borchard, Reverse PassingOff-Commercial Robbery OrPermissible Competition?, 67
TRADEMARKREP. 1

(1977).

83. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946). In Mishawaka Rubber& Woolen Mfg. Co.
v. S.S.Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942), the Court stated:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. It if is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that
we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led
to believe he wants.... Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of
the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
84. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating
that the term "hog" is deemed generic for large motorcycles; dictionary usage supports
generic status of term).
85. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
86. "Secondary meaning" is "the consuming public's understanding that the mark,
when used in context, refers not to what the descriptive word ordinarily describes, but
to the particular business that the mark is meant to identify." Perini Corp. v. Perini
Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. The distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks was outlined in
Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1996). In
Mesabi, the court stated:
A suggestive mark is one that requires some measure of imagination to reach
a conclusion regarding the nature of the product. A descriptive mark, on the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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and arbitrary marks are those selected without regard to the type of good which
the marks identify. While a suggestive mark requires imagination to identify the
good's nature, an arbitrary mark "has no meaning at all" 8 relative to the product.
In the absence of confusion, use of a trademark is not prohibited.89
Infringement occurs when the owner of the mark demonstrates that "such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."' Trademark law
is designed to prevent confusion as to the origin or source of a product,91 and the
degree of protection accorded a trademark is determined by whether the mark is
generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary. 92 Trade dress protection may also
extend to the "look" of a clothing line. In SamaraBros. Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc.93 the consistent copying of a line of children's clothing was actionable,
absent a defense providing another explanation. Intentional copying gives rise
to a presumption that confusion is likely.94

other hand, immediately conveys the nature of function of the product and is

entitled to protection only if it has become distinctive by acquiring a second
meaning.
Id. (citations omitted). A term which is self-laudatory and is "seeking to convey the
impression that a product is excellent or of especially high quality, is generally deemed
suggestive." Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1509 (2d Cir. 1997).
88. TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc., 126 F.3d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
89. In Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924), the Supreme Court
disapproved of an injunction which prohibited a repackager from using the original
manufacturer's mark on its package. The Court stated:
A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the
owner's goodwill against the sale of another's product as .... When the mark is
used in a way that does not deceive the public, we see no such sanctity in the word
as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo.

Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. 11 14(a)(1) (1994). Inherent in the nature of trademark protection is
the necessity to be consistent; to use the asserted mark for a source-identifying function.
In Rock & Roll Hall ofFame v. Gentile Productions,134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1998),
the Court held that a distinctive building design did not function as a trademark because
the court could not "conclude that they create a consistent and distinct commercial
impression as an indicator of a single source of origin or sponsorship.... Consistent and
repetitive use of a designation as an indicator of source is the hallmark of a trademark."
91. Reverse infringement, or reverse passing off, differs from the "forward"
confusion case, although it is also a form of misattribution but it "occurs when a product
is mislabeled to mask the creator's contribution." Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255,
1260 (9th Cir. 1994). In DreamwerksProd.Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127,
1130 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998), the focus of the possibility of confusion was measured by the
famous mark "required to defend its very existence against a much lesser known mark."
Id. at 1131.
92. See WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984).
93. 165 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 1998).
94. See Ferrari SPA Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243 (6th Cir. 1991).
The court further held that post-sale confusion by members of the public is to be
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The Lanham Act also contains a provision that partially codifies unfair
competition law, including a prohibition against false advertising." In Section
43(a), the Lanham Act provides expansive protection for unfair competition, for

registered as well as unregistered marks. The expanse of Section 43(a) is such
that it has "been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition." 6 In 1988, Section 43(a) was amended to provide a statutory
codification of original text which had been judicially expanded.97 A violation
of the Section occurs when the defendant misrepresents its product: "This
provision makes illegal a broad array of rather amorphous practices that are
commonly arranged under the loose rubric of 'unfair competition."' 98 Section
43(a) has compelled the creation of a scheme separating the scope of protection
according to the degree of distinctiveness.
Trade dress is defined as the "total image of a product and may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or
even particular sales techniques."99 Trade dress is "an important ingredient in
the commercial success of the product."' As described by the Supreme Court
in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc.,01 trade dress protects "essentially [a

product's] total image and overall appearance."'"
The likelihood of
confusion,"0 3 however, requires consideration of the purportedly protected

considered in determining the existence of confusion and the potential effect on the first
manufacturer's reputation, rather than only on the potential confusion experienced by
purchasers. Id. at 1245; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Sila, 118 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1997)
(involving a distinctive automobile design and emphasizing the possibility of post-sale
confusion and the first manufacturer's reputation).
95. Lanham Act, § 43(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994) (prohibiting
"commercial advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of [the advertiser's] or another person's goods, services
or commercial activities"). See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion
Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 516 (8th Cir. 1996) (surveying decisions on comparative
advertising).
96. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
97. S.REP. No. 100-515, at 4041 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5603-04.
98. Sovereign Order of St. John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1242 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1163 (1998).

99. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir.
1983).
100. Id. at 983 n.27.
101. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).

102. Id. at 770 (stating that "[t]here is no persuasive reason to apply [different
analysis to trademarks and trade dress]").
103. See A&H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 202

(3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting its "possibility of confusion" standard in trademark infringement
cases for the "likelihood of confusion" standard, which was standard across the circuit
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elements in a product; this requires consideration of the elements in which
"protection is claimed in a context which takes into account the individual
element of the entire trade dress. ' '1t 4
Protected trade dress may not be functional. Functional trade dress is "an
important degree in the commercial success of the product"'"5 and the prohibition
against the protection of a functional component serves to prevent exclusion
from the market of competitors requiring the functional elements of a product to
compete.10 6 The Supreme Court, in Qualitex Co. v. JacobsonProducts Co.,107
stated: "'a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of
the article,' that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." The purpose of the functional
limitation was elaborated upon in Vornado Air Circulation Systems Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp.' In Vornado, a spiral grill on a fan was deemed unprotected
since it had been claimed in a utility patent. The court determined that "core
patent principles [would] be significantly undermined" since the trade dress
protection would continue after expiration of the patent, while only "peripheral

courts).
104. Nora Beverages Inc. v. Perrier Group, 164 F.3d 736,744 (2d Cir. 1998).
105. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995).
"Rigorous application of the requirements of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality is

essential in order to avoid undermining the carefully circumscribed statutory regimes.
.. [of] federal patent and copyright law... ." Id. The Second Circuit, in LeSportsac v.
K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985), defined functional elements as those
which are "essential to a product's use as opposed to those which merely identify it." See
also Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If trade
dress protection of a product design goes too far, however, the public may be deprived
of the benefits of robust competition by precluding use of utilitarian product features.").
A 1998 amendment to the Lanham Act, §33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1994), added a
defense against infringement of a mark that has become incontestable: that the mark is
functional. See Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
107. 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). Qualitex held that color alone, in the case at issue for a
green-gold pressing pad used by dry cleaners, was not precluded form serving as a
trademark. Because color is never inherently distinctive, trade dress for which color is
claimed as an element requires secondary meaning to be protected as a trademark. See
Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1997).
108. 58 F.3d 1498, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996); cf
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 336 (1998) (applying "traditional rule" permitting trademark protection in a feature
of an expired patent; however, expired patent is evidentiary factor in determining
functionality of feature).
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Lanham Act protections [would] be denied" if the grill were copied by a
competitor since other band identifiers were available to prevent confusion."
In Two Pesos,"° the Supreme Court defined "inherently distinctive" trade
dress as trade dress whose "intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source
of a product." '' Trade dress may be inherently distinctive or may acquire
distinctiveness." 2 Permitting Lanham Act protection under Section 43(a) based
on a determination of "inherent distinctiveness" facilitates the development of
projected rights. As the Supreme Court has observed:
[A]dding a secondary meaning requirement could have
anticompetitive effects, creating particular burdens on the startup of
small companies. It would present special difficulties for [companies]
... seek[ing] to start a new product in a limited area and then expand
into new markets. Denying protection for inherently distinctive
nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning has been
established would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a
distinctive trade dress of its own, to appropriate the originator's dress
in other markets and to deter the originator from expanding into and
113
competing in these areas.
The test for infringement is amplified by a list of factors, or "digits of
confusion" analysis,"' identified by the Second Circuit in PolaroidCorp. v.
PolaradElectronics Corp."5 The Polaroidfactors are (1) the strength of the

plaintiffs mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the
competitive proximity of the products or services; (4) the existence of actual
confusion; (5) the likelihood that the plaintiff will 'bridge the gap' between the
two markets; (6) the defendants' good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality

109. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1509.
110. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
111. Id. at771.
112. Id. at 769. As elaborated upon in Duraco Prods.v. Joy PlasticEnters., 40
F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994), distinctiveness is accorded an expanded meaning:
"[T]he Supreme Court in Two Pesos used 'distinctive' in a dual sense, meaning either
inherently distinctive or having acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."

113. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775.
114. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998).
115. 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,368 U.S. 820 (1961). The Polaroid
factors continue to represent the preferred approach to confusion in trademark
infringement actions in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,256 (2d Cir. 1987). Similarly, numerous cases identify
similar factors in other circuits. See, e.g., Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 110 F.3d 234,
241-42 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 688 (1998); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824
F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
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of the defendant's products; and (8) the sophistication of the purchasers. The
factors have been construed skeptically in trade dress cases.116
A recent addition to the Lanham Act also provides against trademark
dilution. The antidilution provision "protect[s] famous trademarks from
subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage
it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.""' 7 Accordingly, it is a
"narrow remedy [for situations] when the similarity between two marks is great
enough that even a noncompeting, nonconfusing use is harmful to the senior
user." In IP. Lund TradingApS v. Kohler Co.,'" the First Circuit, in assessing
the requisite fame under the statute, deemed "national renown" to be "an
important factor" in meeting the requirements for stating a claim under the
dilution provision of the Lanham Act.

116. Cf I.P. Lund Trading ApS & Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st
Cir. 1998) (characterizing the Supreme Court's treatment of Abercrombie& Fitch Co.
v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1976), in Two Pesos as being reflective of
the specific case before it and accordingly not mandatory; the court did not perceive an
analysis using factors different from Abercrombie would result in a alteration of core
holding in Two Pesos); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,788 (8th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Two Pesos's definition of trade dress as encompassing a single element,
rather than separate elements of configuration and packaging).
117. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995). The
Act excludes specific uses from its coverage: fair use of a famous mark in comparative
advertising when used to identify the goods or services of the famous mark;
noncommercial use; and, news reporting and commentary. See, e.g., Luigino's Inc. v.
Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999) (deeming "Lean Cuisine" trademark neither
infringed nor diluted by "Michelina's Lean 'N Tasty" trademark); Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting a dilution claim since dilution requires more than a showing that
consumers would make a mental association between the famous mark "Greatest Show
on Earth" and defendant's mark "Greatest Show on Earth," which was used to promote
skiing); see also Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a "commercial use" for purposes of the federal trademark dilution statute
occurred when registrant attempted to sell to a trademark owner a domain name
consisting of a registered trademark); cf Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp.
931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985) (permitting use of the registered mark "Star Wars" for use in
public commentary on the Strategic Defense Initiative).
118. 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that consumer surveys would be
important evidence of the require level of fame but were not used in the case).
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5. Publicity
a. Introduction to the Right of Publicity
Although the right of publicity is often classified as an outgrowth of the
right of privacy," 9 it deals with the commercial value of a personality interest
and accordingly is more closely analogous to a property interest than a privacy
interest.120 The right of publicity recognizes the commercial value of a
likeness.' The cause of action is confined to unconsented commercial use" of
the plaintiffs likeness." As the Sixth Circuit has stated, "a celebrity's legal
right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally appropriated
for commercial purposes.' ' 24 In Matthews v. Wozencraft,'25 creation of a

119. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-72
(1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 46 (1995).
For the background of the evolution of the right of publicity from the right of
privacy, see generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right ofPublicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954).
120. A privacy interest is a recognition of the commercial value of a likeness and
confines the cause of action to unconsented commercial use of the plaintiff's likeness.
See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In

Zacchini,the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state claim for compensation
was not preempted when an unauthorized broadcast of the plaintiff's "human cannonball"
act affected the commercial viability of the plaintiff's performance.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 625A(2) (1977) provides four separate
grounds for a cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy, including
"appropriation of the other's name or likeness."
121. See Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
("A [person] has a right in the publicity value of his photograph.... Whether it be
labeled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property'
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth."), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
122. An unconsented use of a person's identity may also involve a violation of the
law forbidding false endorsements. Publicity rights are, however, broader since use of
an identity does not necessarily involve a misrepresentation. See Cardtoons v. Major
League Baseball Players, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996).
123. The publicity cause of action has been extended to the use of "look alikes"
since it is the plaintiffs publicity interest which is being appropriated. See, e.g., Allen
v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Onassis v. Christian-DiorNew York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984). Or where the surroundings, such as a
distinctive car, suggested the presence of the plaintiff. See Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). But not to situations where a
distinct identification is not possible, even if there is a close resemblance. See Nurmi v.
Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775, 1777 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
124. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir.
1983). A number of other cases have contained similar holdings. See, e.g., Benavidez
v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989); Titan Sports Inc. v. Comics
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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fictionalized biography did not provide a basis for a subject to prevail on a claim
of violation of the right of publicity since "Texas law does not recognize a cause
of action for appropriation of one's life story and because if it did, there would
be an exception for biographies and 'fictionalized biographies."" 26 Nonetheless,
the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the value of providing a right of publicity in
appropriate contexts:
Protecting one's name or likeness from misappropriation is socially
beneficial because it encourages people to develop special skills,
which then can be used for commercial advantage. Associating one's
good will with a product transmits valuable information to consumers.
Without the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one's
likeness, that likeness would be exploited commercially until the
marginal value of its use is zero. 27
This right has been applied to look-alikes, including those in a mechanical form,
when there is potential for confusion. 2 8 Accordingly, use of a likeness for a
newsworthy purpose is not actionable.
Conversely, a commercial purpose
may be an integral component of a cause of action for violation of the right of
publicity. 30 A commercial purpose did not defeat a First Amendment claim of

World Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311 (2d Cir. 1989); National Bank v. Shaklee
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 541 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723,
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Lugosi v. UniversalPictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)
(superseded by statute), the California Supreme Court referred to the "commercially
exploitable opportunities" which requires the "protection of name and likeness from
unwarranted intrusion or exploitation [which] is the heart of the law of privacy."
125. 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at437.
127. Id. at 437-38.
128. See White v. Samsung Elects. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). "We agree that the robot ad did not make use of White's
name or likeness. However, the common law right of publicity is not so confined." Id.
at 1397. White received a jury verdict of $403,000. Ellen Joan Pollock, Vanna White
Wins Suit, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 24, 1994, at B2.
129. See Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[T]he New York courts have been vigilant in interpreting the right of privacy to permit
the free flow of information."); see also Titan Sports, Inc., v. Comics World Corp., 870
F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1989); Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988);
Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1988). Use of a celebrity's

name in an advertisement, as opposed to a news item, forecloses assertion of the

"newsworthy" defense. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416
(9th Cir. 1996); cf Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
that absence of commercial advantage from use of a name identical to plaintiffs, a
musician, for a fictional character in a television series forecloses publicity claim).
130. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying New
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parody in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association,

where 3' baseball trading cards featured caricatures of major league baseball
players with satirical commentary; the players were "lampooned" on the trading
cards.' In addition, the Tenth Circuit stated parody cards do not meaningfully
impact the property right represented by the identity interest in publicity since
the interest normally would not be licensed.'33
Within this general approach, there are also variations among states134 on
the issues of the continued existence of common law rights of action with
statutorily created publicity rights'35 and the viability of a cause of action after
the death of the subject of the publicity.'3 6

Jersey law); cf Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App.
Div. 1988) (applying "advertisement in disguise" exception to allow claim for privacy
protection to use of nonpublic person's name and identifying information on a
advertising calendar).
131. 95 F.3d 959, 968-69 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Bettie Page v. Something
Weird Video, 908 F. Supp. 714, 716 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (deeming the use of drawings of
the plaintiff, used to market films made by her in the 1950s, to be protected by the First
Amendment on the basis that the availability of the films was "newsworthy").
132. 95 F.3d at 962.
133. Id. at 964.
134. But see Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 n.6 (Minn.
1996) (rejecting publicity and privacy rights). Cf Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d
725, 729 (8th Cir. 1995) (predicting adoption of a right ofpublicity in Minnesota despite
rejection of privacy).
135. For example, New York recognizes only a statutory cause of action. See N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50,51 (Consol. 1989); see also Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d
579 (2d Cir. 1990). The New York statute was passed in response to a rejection of a
common law cause of action in Roberson v. Rochester FoldingBox Co., 64 N.E. 442
(N.Y. 1902). See generally, Frederick Kessler, Note, A Common Lawfor the Statutory
Era: The Right of Publicity and New York's Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 951 (1987).
In contrast, the Utah statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-4 (1988) creates a cause of
action for the unconsented use of a name or likeness in a manner suggested that the
individual represented approves or endorses the subject matter of an advertisement but
also preserves common law remedies. See, e.g., Nature's Way Prod., Inc. v. NaturePharma Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 251 (D. Utah 1990).
136. The Second Restatement ofTorts provides that "[e]xcept for the appropriation
of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by
a living individual whose privacy is invaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521(1977). CompareGroucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 320
(2d Cir. 1982) (publicity right not descendible under California law) with Acme Circus
Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1542-44 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (publicity right
descendible under California law if exercised during the subject's lifetime) and Memphis
Dev., Inc. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957-59 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 953 (1980) (holding that under Tennessee law the right of publicity is not
descendible even though exercised during his lifetime). In State ex rel. Elvis PresleyInt'l
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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The logic behind publicity actions has caused recovery to be extended to the
analogous situation where a performer's persona is appropriated through the use
of his or her voice in a manner which deceives the public as to the actual identity
of the performer. 37 In Midler v. FordMotor Co.,' the court identified a basis
for the plaintiff's cause of action under California law when a noted performer
with a distinctive voice'39 and a distinctive performance style contended that her
voice and style were duplicated in a commercial advertisement by a "sound
alike" who was requested to duplicate the plaintiff's style. 40 The case, and
similar cases, raise questions about claims to other aspects of a performance,
including a style, a characterization, and a mood. 4' Prior to Midler, duplication
of performance was a widespread practice."'

Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), the court
considered the right of publicity no less an intangible property right after death and
asserted that unjust enrichment principles precludes against permitting an advertiser to
obtain a 'vindfall" from an identity it had not created while effectively diminishing the
value of any licensed uses.
137. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1996)
("The key issue [in a case asserting a right of publicity] is the appropriation of the
plaintiffs identity.").
138. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). InMidler v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 944 F.2d
909 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished), a jury verdict was sustained and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict.
139. The defense of preemption, which would foreclose protection of federal law,

was raised in Midler. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defense since the claim was not
within the subject matter of copyright since a voice is not subject to copyright protection.
Id. at 909. Similarly, in Waits v. Frito-Lay,Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1992),

a jury instruction restricted liability to a determination that only the plaintiffs voice was
mimicked, not his style.
140. But see Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 838
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the New York statute creating a right of privacy, as well
as a right of publicity, did not to cover a "sound alike" cause of action); Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906
(1971). Cf Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (lst Cir. 1962) (holding that an
inferior imitation of a performer caused an injury for a cause of action based on injury
to reputation). See generallyLeonard A. Wohl, Note, The Right ofPublicity and Vocal
Larceny: Sounding Offon Sound-Alikes, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 445 (1988).
141. See Joanne Lipman, More CelebritiesSue Over 'Imitation'Ads,WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 1989, at B5.
142. See generallyRandall Rothenberg, Suit Deters Ad Jingles the Mimic Singers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1988, at D6; Richard Schmitt, Singers Get Green Light to Sue
Imitators, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 9, 1988, at B13.
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b. Ideas
43
Although ideas may be valuable, ideas are not protected by copyright
and, ordinarily, become part of the public domain when disclosed.'" An
exception to that general premise has occurred as the result of a set of equitable
principles"4 ' requiring payment for the disclosure of an idea submitted in
circumstances reflecting an expectation of payment, even though an express
contract covering the disclosure does not exist. 4 6 Compensation for submission
147
of ideas in these circumstances requires that the idea be novel and original,

143. Ideas are expressly excluded from the subject matter of copyright. See §
102(b) discussed supra note 56. Additionally, even where a work is protected by
copyright, the scope of protection for the work may be narrow if the method of
expressing the underlying ideas is "too inseparable from the idea itself to warrant
protection." Ring v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 874 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1989). Because the
scope of protection granted by the copyright will be severely limited, under the premise
of "indispensable" expression which recognizes the limited number of ways of
expressing the same idea, see Frybargerv. InternationalBus.Machs., 812 F.2d 525, 530
(9th Cir. 1987), the protection accorded by copyright precludes placing a limitation on
the underlying idea.
144. See, e.g., Joyce v. General Motors Corp., 551 N.E.2d 172, 172 (Ohio 1990)
(stating that "[ildeas are not the property of anyone unless they are expressed in a legally
protected manner"). In Joyce, the court found that once an idea was "freely divulged to
a third party... the ideas are not property, [and] they are not capable of conversion or
appropriation." Id. at 175.
145. See JOHN P. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

148

(1951).
146. See Miller v. Schloss, 113 N.E. 337, 338-39 (N.Y. 1916). Existence of an
express contract will preclude the application of equitable principles and serve as the
entire basis for the determining the right to, and the amount of, any recovery. See
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497, 1502 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1990). In Buchwald, the contract between the parties required
compensation to be paid to the plaintiff, if a motion picture was produced which was
"based upon" a submission by the author. Id. The Buchwald case also reflects the value
of credit for a successful work in enhancing an author's marketability; Buchwald was
awarded $150,000 after a bench trial. Bernard Weinraub, Art Buchwald Awarded
$150,000 in Suit Over Film, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1992, at Cl. See Aljean Harmetz,
Buchwald Ruling: Film Writers vs. StarPower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan., 15, 1990, at D3; see
also City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1988). See generally
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, COMPENSATION FOR THE

Cf.Osbom v. Boeing
Airplane Co., 309 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1962) ("Since it is conceded that Boeing
solicited useful ideas whether or not they were original with the employee or new
originality or novelty would not be a material issue as to the cause of action based upon
an implied-in-fact contract.").
147. In Downey v. GeneralFoods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 260 (N.Y. 1972), a
leading case, the court states two requirements as absolute conditions for recovery of
compensation for the submission of an idea: "[W]hen one submits an idea to another,
UNSOLICITED DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS IDEAS 579 (1952).
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since ideas which are not novel are considered part of the public domain and
unprotected. 4 The idea must also be kept secret before disclosure 149 and
disclosed in circumstances reflecting an expectation of compensation upon
disclosure."' Additionally, the idea for which compensation is sought must be
concrete,' 5 1 and communication of the idea must be made in circumstances
justifying imposition
of an obligation to make payment for the use of the
52
disclosed idea.

Application of these principles is illustrated in Murray v. National
BroadcastingCo., which resulted in the granting of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant on the plaintiff's claim that he had developed the idea on which
"The Cosby Show," a television program portraying "a nonstereotypical black
family,"''5 was based. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of

no promise to pay for its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the
elements of novelty and originality are absent, since the property right in an idea is based
upon these two elements." See also Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
955 F.2d 1173, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that lack of novelty in hotel concept
forecloses recovery under any theory, including trade secret protection); Brain v. Dannon
Milk Prods., Inc., N.Y.S.2d 571, 571 (App. Div. 1970) ("Lack of novelty in an idea is
fatal to any cause of action for its unlawful use."). But cf Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co.,
783 F.2d 285, 300 (2d Cir. 1986) (characterizing California law as not requiring novelty
or originality in the context of information disclosed under confidential circumstances
but declining to allow recovery for "mundane" information). In Reeves v. Alyseka
PipelineServ. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1141 (Alaska 1996), the Alaska Supreme Court found
California precedents persuasive in holding that an idea may be valuable to a recipient
in the timing and manner of the manner in which an idea is disclosed.
Although the property approach to the law controlling the submission of ideas has
been criticized, Margreth Barrett, The 'Law of Ideas' Reconsidered, 71 J. PAT. &

TRADEMARK Soc'Y 691, 757 (1989), the property approach is generally the theory used
to evaluate claims for recovery involving the submission of ideas. See, e.g., Murray v.
National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988). Theories of recovery often
blend in this area and may be asserted on a general equitable basis as well as on a
contract implied-in-fact or quasi-contract basis. See Surplus Equip. Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,
502 N.Y.S.2d 491,492 (App. Div. 1986); Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912,
923 (4th Cir. 1936); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1942).
148. See Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988);
Educational Sales Programs v. Dreyfus Corp., N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
149. See Ring v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 874 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1989) ("This
observation of the public use of the idea by a third party totally precludes plaintiffs
claims.").
150. See, e.g., McGhan v. Ebersol, 603 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
151. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706,708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(holding that an incomplete radio script met this requirement because it was useable even
though incomplete).
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. h (1995).
153. 844 F.2d at 992.
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summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's idea was
not novel and was therefore unprotected since it existed in the public domain.54
Consequently, a successful action for recovery of the submission of an idea -will
require the developer of the idea to anticipate the requirements under which it is
disclosed.
c. Trade Secrets
Trade secret protection is premised on the relative secrecy of information
valuable to a business 5 and retained in secrecy 5 6 through reasonable
precautions.' 57 In order to qualify as a trade secret, the information for which
protection is sought cannot be readily ascertainable 5 ' or part of the general body
of knowledge in an industry.159 Improperly obtaining the information contained
in a trade secret will give rise to a claim for damages and other relief for the
misappropriation of a trade secret.16°

154. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988).
155. Computer-based espionage, or "netspionage" is an emerging concern since
information stored in a digital form on a computer network can be appropriated without
leaving traces of the theft. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Stop, Thiefi, WALL. ST. J., Jan.
11, 1999, at R50.
156. See, e.g., Public Sys., Inc. v. Towery, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1222 (Ala.
1991) (sending customer list to prospective clients precluded trade secret protection). See

also Tabor v. Hoffiman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a set of patterns, used
to manufacture a machine which were made without pattern owners' permission;
constituted an unfair means of procuring patterns which was not disclosed by the sale of
the machine that was made from the patterns).
157. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in
ValuableInformation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980) (arguing that reasonable precautions

are effectively evidence of the existence of a trade secret).
158. Compare Allen v. Johar, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Ark. 1992) (trade secret
protection accorded to customer list containing personalized information and requiring
several years to create) with Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Moore, 775 F.2d 996, 997 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding that customer list was not a trade secret, since it was readily ascertainable
and had been developed by defendant when he was employed by the plaintiff). See also
Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that simple recipes

were readily ascertainable and accordingly did not qualify for trade secret protection).
159. See Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. National Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937,942

(7th Cir. 1996).
160. The misappropriation of trade secrets may also be a component of a claim
under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or "RICO." 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994). See, e.g., Formax, Inc. v. Hostert, 841 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (holding that a claim, 18 U.S.C. §9162(b), was held properly pleaded in an action
involving the alleged theft of proprietary engineering drawings containing trade secrets
and the alleged infringement of a patent). The federal RICO statute provides for treble
damages, and the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
A RICO claim requires that a plaintiff demonstrate injury to his business or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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The Economic Espionage Act of 1996161 uses an expansive definition of
"trade secret," which includes "all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical; economic, or engineering information.. ." A working
definition of "trade secrets" was articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court when
it defined a "trade secret" as "a plan or process, tool, mechanism, compound, or
informational data utilized by a person in his business operations and known
only to him and such limited other persons to whom it may be necessary to
confide it."' 62 A trade secret is defined in the Restatement of Torts as:

[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is

used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other
device, or a list of customers. 63
The Uniform Trade Secret Act contains a broader definition, including
within the definition of "trade secret" information which has a negative value,
such as the realization that a process is ineffective or a list of customers who do
not purchase the compiler's products. 64 Consistent with these expansive

property and that the injury was a result of the racketeering activity which constitutes the
RICO violation. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187 (4th Cir. 1988).
The showings a plaintiff must make are defined in Section 1962. Section 1962(b)
provides: "it shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
...to acquire or maintain ...any interest or control of any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1994).
The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly held RICO applicable to
"legitimate" business. See H.J Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
For a review of the criticism surrounding the application to situations not involving
organized crime, and a proposal to restrict the reach of RICO, see S. REP. No. 101-269
(1990).
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (Supp. 1I 1997) (punishing the "theft" of trade secrets).
162. ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971).
163. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Summarizing the
Restatement's definition, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
In sum, a trade secret need not be novel, inventive, or patentable, and may be
a device that is clearly anticipated in the prior art or one that is merely a
mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make. However, it may
not be part of the general knowledge or information of an industry or a matter
of public knowledge.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 893 (N.J. 1988).
164. See Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1333
(9th Cir. 1980).
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definitions of "trade secret," a number of types65 of commercially valuable
information have been classified as trade secrets.1
Trade secret protection, a protection accorded by state law, is premised on
secrecy' 6 as a requirement of protection. Any disclosure by fair means,
including reverse engineering or disassembly of an object, 67 may defeat the
continued existence of trade secret protection.' 6 Indeed, the practice of
"benchmarking" a rival's product by disassembling it and attempting to beat the
product on a component-by-component basis has become an important aspect of
competitive intelligence efforts. 169 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he
subject of a trade secret must be secret and must not be of public knowledge or
of general knowledge in the trade or business."' 70 Importantly, the existence of
a protected trade secret is conditioned on actual implementation of measures
resulting in the information being treated as confidential; a failure to implement

such measures will result in the information being deemed unprotected.'

165. See, e.g., Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux Lab., 908 F.2d 706, 711 (11th Cir. 1990)
(poultry vaccine trade secret under Georgia law); Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho,
272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 358 (Ct. App. 1990) (customer list protected as trade secret). Trivial
business information will not qualify for trade secret protection. See KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAw 236

(1988). This requirement is sometimes phrased as a requirement of"minimnum novelty."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
Additionally, a business may implement "know how" which is the "accumulated
skills, experience, processes, and procedures, not reaching the level of trade secrets."
Jeffrey M. Wiesen, The Elements of a Domestic License ofIntellectualProperty,9 ALIABA COuRSE MATERiALS J. 55 (1984).
166. Information which is a matter of common public knowledge will not qualify
as a trade secret. See Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462,
465 (9th Cir: 1990).
167. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1073 n.38
(E.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that reverse engineering "is the process by which a
competitor's product is disassembled, and its components analyzed so that the product
can be reproduced").
168. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475; Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter
Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 1980). See also Toro Co. v. R & R Prods.
Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that replacement parts numbering
system was uncopyrightable and that competitor was permitted to use plaintiff's
identifying parts numbers).
169. Brian Dumaine, CorporateSpies Snoop to Conquer,FORTUNE, Nov. 7, 1988,
at 68.
170. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475.
171. See Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus. Inc., 730 F. Supp. 171, 178-79
(N.D. II. 1990) (holding that although engineering drawings were marked "confidential"
and vendors receiving confidential engineering drawings were required to sign a contract
obligating the vendor to treat the drawings as the plaintiff's property and in confidence,
but where the court found that secrecy requirements were routinely disregarded, negating
a showing of secrecy requisite to the protection of business information as a trade secret),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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A cause of action for misappropriation of a trade secret requires
demonstrating the existence of a trade secret, breach of confidence or other
fiduciary duty, and use of a trade secret. 72 The Economic Espionage Act
expansively defines theft of trade secrets to include unauthorized appropriations

trade secrets by concealment "or by fraud, artifice, or
or obtaining protected
73
deception ..... 1

d. Design Protection
Although design protection was favored by the Copyright Office 74 during
the revision process resulting in the Copyright Act of 1976, the House identified
two fundamental concerns, dealing with administration of design protection and
protection for typefaces, which resulted in the proposed design protection's
deletion from the revision.
Thus, in exploiting an unprotected design, a
competitor may even use the original manufacturer's name to identify its product
as the equivalent of the original. 76

rev 'don other grounds, 925 F. Supp. 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
172. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987).
173. William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes a
Misappropriationofa Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287 (1990).
174. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE

GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 4-24 (Comm. Print 1965).
175. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5663,
5659; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1733, at 82 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810,
5823.
176. See Tyco Indus. Inc. v. Lego Sys., Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1045
(D.N.J. 1987) (permitting a comparison to be made in advertisements, so long as an
express disclaimer of association was included. Tyco advertised its toy blocks using the
slogan, "If you can't tell the difference, why pay the difference?"); see also Erik
Bjerager, Denmark'sLego ChallengesImitators of Its Famous Toy Blocks Across the
Globe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1987, at 1-18. The origin of Lego's interchangeable block
system is described in Israel Shenker, Playing With Blocks Can Be A Fine Art At This
Theme Park;LegolandPark,Denmark, SMITHSONIAN, June, 1988, at 120.
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III. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLICLY DISCLOSED TRADE VALUES

A. Introduction to Unfair Competition
Unfair competition 77
. law begins with the recognition, even in the cases, 78
of a right to engage in competitive conduct.'79 The Federal Circuit has
recognized this right, in the context of the reproduction of uncopyrighted or
unpatented articles, as a right to compete effectively. 8 ' The right to compete is
consistent with the right to engage in business in good faith;'"' "[a]nticompetitive

177. Unfair competition and trademark law are closely related. The Senate Report
which accompanied the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, identified the
constituent nature of the two areas of law:
There is no essential difference between trade-mark infringement
and what is loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition
is the genus of which trade-mark infringement is one of the species
....
All trade-mark cases are cases of unfair competition and
involve the same legal wrong.
S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1275.
178. See e.g., Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Lucker, 150 N.W. 790, 792 (Minn.
1915). A cause of action was stated where competition was carried on exclusively for

purposes of harming another, as opposed to generating profit. See, e.g., Boggs v.
Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 143 N.W. 482,486 (Iowa 1913); Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W.
946, 947 (Minn. 1909).
179. See Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1990)

('There is nothing tortious about competition.").
180. See New England Butt Co. v. I.T.C., 756 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(quoting In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982));
accord Haagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Gladje, Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(competitor's right to use marketing approach to facilitate consumer reception of
product).
In Kellogg Co. v. NationalBiscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938), Justice Holmes
stated:
Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the
exercise of a right possessed by all - and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested.
Intellectual property rights, in turn, encourage the production of works such to
protection but slow their dissemination. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 28.2, at 632 (3d ed. 1986).
181. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 708 (1938). Comment c to this provision

states that the "basic right to compete is a basic assumption in the law of unfair
competition, as it is, in an even broader form, in the economics of free enterprise and in
the politics of individualism." Id. Similarly, Comment d states: "The theory is that, in
the long run, competition promotes efficiency and economic general welfare and that to
subject a person to liability merely for competing would result in preventing
competition." Id. See also Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (stating, in the context of the Sherman Act, that the antitrust laws rest "on the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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conduct is conduct without legitimate
82 business purpose that makes sense only
because it eliminates competition.'
Accordingly, consistent with the right to compete, conduct which
constitutes effective competition is not actionable.' While "[i]t is impossible
to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices [since] [t]here is no limit
to human inventiveness in this field,"'" unfair competition must constitute
"objectionable conduct attain[ing] a level of rascality that would raise an
eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of
commerce."' 85 Unfair competition has also been defined to expansively include
misuse of a position of trust, as when an employee obtains a competitive
advantage
from assignment of the employee to a business development
86
project.'

premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions").
182. Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1358 (8th Cir. 1989).
183. See, e.g., Vegelahm v. Gutner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-81 (Mass. 1896). In
Vegelahm, Justice Holmes stated:
[T]he policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional inflicting of
temporal damage, including the damage ofinterference with a man's business
by some means, when the damage is done, not for its own sake, but as an
instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade.

Id.
184. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914). Regulations interpreting the
Federal Trade Commission Act's definition of unfairness, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994),
require that in order to constitute unfair competition, an act must (1) be within "at least
the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
and (2) [be] ... immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous .... " 29 Fed. Reg.
8355 (1964).
185. Quaker State Oil Refining v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir.
1989) (quoting Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1979))
(applying Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11 (1985)). Similarly, the conduct must be
"immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and result in "substantial injury... to
competitors or other businessmen" and be within an established concept of unfairness.
PMP Assocs., Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Co., N.E.2d 915, 917 (1975) (applying
Massachusetts law).
186. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1074
(E.D. Mich. 1983). In Johns-Manville the court defined unfair competition in these
terms: "The concept is designed to reach confidential matters and fiduciary relationships
which do not fit within the formal categories of either trade secret or patent protection,
yet nevertheless constitute an advantage wrongfully appropriated by defendant." Id.
Several states also recognize a cause of action, under the label prima facie tort, for
unjustified injury to a business interest. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870
(1977) characterizes prima facie tort as,"conduct [which] is generally culpable and not
justified under the circumstances." See, e.g., Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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B. Unfair Competition PrecedingInternationalNews Service
1. Introduction
Unfair competition law in the United States as sketched by Judge Learned
Hand, in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.," 7 was characterized by its
evolving nature. As Judge Hand stated, "[t]here is no part of the law which is
more plastic than unfair competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable
wrong 25 years ago may have become such today." Unfair competition law
emerged as "a development of the law of fraud. Its aim was simply to prevent
the deceitful sale or passing off of goods made by one person or firm for goods
made by another."' 88 Unfair competition's focus was on ensuring fair
competition.'89 Despite broad statements of equitable power to redress activity
deemed unfair, the common denominator was generally the deception of the
purchaser resulting in the capture of business from that deception. 9
F.2d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1990); Chen v. United States, 854 F.2d 622, 627-28 (2d Cir.
1988); Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475,478 (S.D.N.Y.
1944).
187. 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'don othergrounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
188. Myron W. Watkins, The Changein Trust Policy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 815, 831
(1922). For a related view, see E.R. Coffin, Fraudas an Element of Unfair Competition,

16 HARv.L. REv. 272 (1903).
189. Early authorities defining unfair competition emphasized a fluid view of
unfair competition. See, e.g., I Heinisch's Sons Co. v. Boker, 86 F. 765, 768
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898). In Boker the court stated:
It is clear that the devices adopted by defendants deceive ordinary purchasers.
The law, firmly established by repeated decisions in this circuit, enjoins every
artifice which promotes unfair trade. ... A court of equity keeps pace with
the rapid strides of the sharp competitors for the prize of public favor, and
insists that it shall be won only by fair trade.
Id. For an equally expansive view of the role of equity in unfair competition cases, see
Grafton D. Cushing, On CertainCasesAnalogous to Trade-Marks,4 HARv. L. REv. 321
(1891). See generally Milton Handler, Unfair Competition,21 IoWAL. REv. 175 (1936);
Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principlesof Unfair Competitionto Cases of

DissimilarProducts,75 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1927). However, unfair competition is
premised on the prevention of deception which results in the sale of substitute goods
because of the purchaser's confusion as to their source. See Resenberg Bros. v. Elliot,
7 F.2d 962 (3d Cir. 1925). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 23 n.31,
Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (Nos. 80-2182 & 81-11)
(Lanham Act promotes fair competition since sellers have incentive to identify products).
190. See, e.g., Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 F. 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1907)
(holding that deliberate appropriation of shape of lock resulting in deception of
purchasers is actionable as unfair competition); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Globe Refining
Co., 92 F. 357, 361 (6th Cir. 1899). In Globe Refining the court stated:
The cardinal rule... is that no one shall, by imitation or any unfair device,
induce the public to believe that the goods he offers for sale are the goods of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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However, early trademark cases also identified a right to copy items in the
public domain, which is consistent with a fair course of dealing when the origin
of the item is not misrepresented. A representative case is DeeringHarvester
Co. v. Whitman Barnes Manufacturing Co. 9' The court held that the
manufacturing of replacement parts which were identified by using the plaintiff's
numbering system was a lawful means of facilitating sale of the defendant's
parts. 92 Since "their whole course of dealing, as shown by [the] evidence
[regarding advertising and other representations] ha[d] been such as to mislead
no one into buying their product[,]" by mistaking the defendant's products for
the plaintiff's products, the defendant's right to use the numbering system was
upheld.193
Where relief was available, the holding typically rested on passing off or
misrepresentation, although a line of cases also suggested that imitation alone
would be actionable as unfair competition. 194 A characteristic case is Globe-

another, and thereby appropriate to himself the value of the reputation which
the other has acquired for his own products or merchandise.
Id. See also Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 146 (Cal. 1895) ("[W]hy
should equity smile upon the one practice and frown upon the other? ... Equity will not
concern itself about the means by which fraud is done. It is the results arising from the
means - it is the fraud itself- with which it deals); Globe-Wemicke v. Fred-Macey,
119 F. 696 (6th Cir. 1902); Saunders Sys. Atlanta Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co., 123 S.E.
132 (Ga. 1924); Sessinghaus Milling Co. v. Hanebrink, 152 S.W. 354 (Mo. 1912); Note,
Is DeceptionA Necessary Ingredientof Unfair Competition?,30 HARV. L. REv. 166, 168

(1916) (criticizing an extension to cases outside of those involving deception).
191. 91 F. 376 (6th Cir. 1898); see also Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel
Range Co., 189 F. 26, 33 (6th Cir. 1911) (copying of overall heater design not actionable
in absence of palming off); Magee Furnace Co. v. LeBarron, 127 Mass. 115, 120, 122
(1879) (no trademark violation in manufacturing unpatented replacement stove parts).
Numbers could however, function as trademarks, in which case they were protected so
long as the numbering system was arbitrary and not functional, such as designating a
quality of the item. See, e.g., Humphreys' Specific Homeopathic Med. Co. v. Wenz, 14
F. 250 (E.D.N.J. 1882) (numbers in series of plaintiff's "Homeopathic Specifics" from
1 to 35 used by public as identifying factor in purchasing medication for specific
condition); Kinney v. Allen, 14 F. Cas. 608, 611 (E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 7,826) (enforcing
limited injunction to preclude defendant's use of "1/2" on cigarettes to foreclose
confusion with plaintiff's trademark, but not to identify use of"1/2" in its original usage
to reflect blend of two kinds of tobacco). Nor did advertising a product create any

protected right to preclude a competitor from participating in the market created by the
advertising absent deception. See Eisenstadt Mfg. Co. v. J.M. Fisher Co., 241 F. 241 (1st

Cir. 1917).
192. DeeringHarvesterCo., 91 F. at 380.
193. Id. at 380.
194. The absence of an analytical style - and the breadth of dicta - of many early
unfair competition cases makes characterization of a precise ground for the holding
problematic. In Rushmore v. BadgerBrass Mfg. Co., 198 F. 379, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1912)
and Yale v. Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 F. 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1907), for example, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Wernicke v. Macey, 195 in which the plaintiff sold an interlocking system of
bookcases in sections." The defendant copied the plaintiff's entire line of wood
finishes, sizes, and styles, permitting purchasers to combine bookcases from the
defendant with bookcases which had been purchased from the plaintiff.'97 No
cause of action was stated since the plaintiff had no exclusive right to any of the
features incorporated into the system employed. 9 '
2. The "Ticker" Cases
Preceding InternationalNews Service, several cases acknowledged the
value of business information and the particular value of the time of receipt of
information. Justice Holmes, in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 199 stated:
In the first place..., the plaintiff's collection of quotations is
entitled to the protection of law. It stands like a trade secret. The
plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for
doing, to itself The fact that others might do similar work, if they

holdings support an interpretation consistent with protection of an exterior product
configuration from imitation, see Protection of Industrial Designs: Hearing Before the
Sub-comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 100th Cong.,
43 (1988) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights), but also contain
statements suggesting an alternative holding premised on traditional passing offgrounds.
See also Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 F. 240, 241 (2d Cir. 1904)
(holding that an exact copy of a coffee mill was unfair competition, apparently relying
on an assumption that exact copying of an item intends deception); Marvel Co. v. Pearl,
133 F. 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1904) (reiterating the traditional rule by allowing copying,
absent an intent to deceive consumers, and characterizing the copying in Enterpriseas
"aggravated" and reflective of deceptive intent).
However, the Second Circuit, in Rushmore v. ManhattanScrew & Stamping Works,
163 F. 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1908), characterized the law of the circuit as extending to the

reproduction of an automobile search light, even though clearly marked as to origin, but
cautioned:
[that this line of cases] carries the doctrine ofunfair competition to its utmost
limit. If it be pushed much farther those engaged in trade will be encouraged
to run to the courts with trivial complaints over the petty details of business
and thus will grow up a judicial paternalism which in time may become
intolerable.

Id.
195. 119 F. 696, 697 (6th Cir. 1902).
196. Id. at 700.
197. Id. at 703-04.

198. Id. at 704.
199. 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905); see also Board of Trade v. Tucker, 221 F. 305
(2d Cir. 1915).
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might, does not authorize them to steal the plaintiffs. The plaintiff
does not lose its rights by communicating the result to persons, even
if many, in confidential relations to itself, under a contract not to make
it public, and strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting at
the knowledge by inducing a breach of trust, and using knowledge
obtained by such a breach.
The publications insisted on in some of the arguments were
publications in breach of contract, and do not affect the plaintiff's
rights. Time is of the essence in matters like this, and it fairly may be
said that, if the contracts with the plaintiff are kept, the information
will not become public property until the plaintiff has gained its
reward. A priority of a few minutes probably is enough.2"
As reflected in Justice Holmes opinion in Board of Trade, and as
appreciated in other "ticker" or business information cases, 20 ' access to
information is valuable. Critical, however, to the "ticker" cases was a
traditional contract, or trade secret, basis for according protection. Illustrative
Co.,202
of this line of cases is F. W. Dodge Co. v. ConstructionInformation
involving a subscription service which reported proposed construction
projects.2 3 The contract between the publisher and its subscribers restricted use

200. Id. at 250-51 (internal citations omitted).
201. A number of pre-InternationalNews Service cases held that trade news or
"special news" constituted a protected form of'property. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Park,
220 U.S. 373, 403 (1910); Hunt v. New York Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322 (1906);
Tucker, 221 F. 305 (2d Cir. 1915); Board of Trade v. Celia Comm'n Co., 145 F. 28 (8th
Cir. 1906); Board of Trade v. L.A. Kinsey Co., 130 F. 507 (7th Cir. 1904); National Tel.
News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902); Board of Trade v.
McDearmott, 143 F. 188 (W.D. Mo. 1906); Board of Trade v. Haden-Krull Co., 109 F.
705 (E.D. Wis. 1901). The right to control information was also recognized in a number
of early cases. See, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 605 (1926)
("In furnishing the quotations to one and refusing to furnish them to another, the
exchange is but exercising the ordinary right of a private vendor of news or other
property."); Chamber of Commerce v. F.T.C., 13 F.2d 673, 687 (8th Cir. 1926) (daily
market quotations "property"); Globe-Wemicke v. Fred-Macey Co., 119 F. 696 (6th Cir.
1902); F.W. Dodge v. Constr. Info. Co., 66 N.E. 204 (Mass. 1903); Gilmore v.
Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). E.P. Dutton & Co. v. Cupples, 102
N.Y.S. 309 (App. Div. 1907), was another early case with both elements of
appropriation, since the distinctive cover of the plaintiffs book was reproduced by
photoduplication, as well as misrepresentation, since the duplication included the
distinctive elements of overall design and color, resulting in confusion. A case closer to
the elements presented in InternationalNews Service is FontopiaLtd. v. Bradley, 171 F.
951, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), where the plaintiff's phonograph record was used as a mold
from which the defendant produced and sold competing copies.
202. 66 N.E. 204 (Mass. 1903).
203. Id. at 205.
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of the information to the subscriber's business and expressly imposed a
confidentiality requirement upon its possession. 2° In describing the publisher's
rights in the information, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held:
The facts, before it has ascertained them, unless they are held for a
special purpose confidentially, and as secrets, are not property; but
when these facts have been discovered promptly by effort and at
expense, and have been compiled and put in form, and are of
commercial value by reason of the speedy use that can be made of
them before they have obtained general publicity, they are property.
They represent expensive effort and valuable service, and, in the form
in which they are presented to subscribers, they may be used with a
reasonable expectation of profit from the early possession of them.
The information is not visible, tangible property, but there is a
valuable right of property in it, which the courts ought to protect in
every reasonable way against those seeking to obtain it from the owner
without right, to his damage. What the plaintiff has when the
defendant seeks to obtain it from him is the possession of valuable
information. This early possession is valuable in itself. The plaintiff
has it and the defendant does not have it. If the defendant can obtain
it legitimately, he becomes the owner of the same kind of property,
and the two may become competitors in the market as vendors to those
who are willing to pay for it. But if the defendant surreptitiously and
against the plaintiff s will takes from the plaintiff and appropriates the
form of expression which is the symbol of the plaintiff's possession,
and thus, by direct attack, as it were, divides the plaintiff's possession,
and shares it, this conduct is a violation of the plaintiffs right of
property .... We are of opinion that one's possession of information
which he has obtained, compiled, and put in form for a specific use is
a right which ought to be protected
against those who would share it
20 5
with him without his consent.
Collectively, these early cases represented a recognition that information could
possess value so that a compiler and publisher of the information had the right
to control its disposition when the dissemination was undertaken pursuant to
contractual provisions which provided for recognition of these rights. Although
that requirement precluded a general application of the underpinnings of these
precedents to published information, the reasoning inherent in recognizing the
value of information .wouldprovide for the next step in the development of the
misappropriation doctrine: protection of publicly-disclosed trade values outside
of situations where an agreement of confidentiality existed between the parties.

204. Id.
205. Id.
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C. The Genesis ofMisappropriation:InternationalNews Service
1. Introduction
In InternationalNews Service, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that
was narrow in its holding and potentially broad in its implications; International
News Service took the early "ticker" cases beyond the clear holdings that
information, and the timing of the possession of information was valuable, and
within the confines of contract, entitled to legal protection. In International
News Service, the Court's expansion of these holdings both embraced the basic
premise-that possession of information was potentially valuable-and severed
the restraint of a contractual, or confidential, relationship, to extend legal
protection to information after publication occurred. Although the facts of
InternationalNews Service conceptually confine the holding, its reasoning was
attractive to plaintiffs in a variety of contexts removed from the protection of
information. In turn, an expansive application of InternationalNews Service and
the misappropriation doctrine would eventually bring the evolving doctrine into
conflict with the federal definition of the public domain.
The InternationalNews Service case arose when International News
Service was banned from cabling news stories from the front of World War I
because of "sundry misdemeanors" the Service had committed.206 In an
affidavit from its general manager, International News Service acknowledged
that it had been barred from using cables from England to the United States for
the transmission of news after the British government charged International
News Service with changing or garbling reports. 0 7 This charge was based on
a comparison of censored material with stories published in several American
newspapers credited to International News Service. The British government also
charged International News Service with violation of censorship restrictions.
International News Service's general manager acknowledged that the restrictions
imposed by the British government had "inconvenienced [International News
Service]..., and ha[d] compelled it on certain matters to use certain news after

it had already been printed in other papers, which practice, however, [was]

customary among all news services and among all newspapers. ....,208
International News Service compensated for this inability to report the warfront
news by copying news obtained from Associated Press's papers on the East
Coast and wiring the facts for rewriting and publication in the western papers
served by International News Service.

206. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 86 (1967).

207. Record at 119-26, International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918) (No. 221).
208. Record at 125-27.
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2. The Majority Opinion

Although the complaint that a defendant in an unfair competition case was
"reaping where it ha[d] not sown" had been made shortly before International
News Service,2° the Supreme Court framed the issue directly in International
News Service:

The question here is not so much the rights of either party as against
the public but their rights as between themselves. And, although we
may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property
interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the
moment of its first publication, it by no means follows that there is no
remaining property interest in it as between themselves. 210
From this formulation, the Court deemed the value of the news collected and
distributed "quasi-property," 21' based upon the traditional "rule that a court of
equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights. 21 2 However, the
requirement of a "property right" was met by an expansive definition "treat[ing]
any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right and the right to acquire
property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled
to protection as the right to guard property already acquired."213 This investment
was placed at risk2 4 by InternationalNews Service's practices.

209. The phrase appears in EisenstadtMfg. Co. v. JM.FisherCo., 232 F. 957, 961

(D.R.I. 1916), where the plaintiff complained that the defendant was sharing in a market
it had created, through advertising, for a distinctive type of friendship bracelet. But the
court identified both an already established market, and the absence of any legal ground
to protest the sharing of a market absent deception by the defendant as to the source of
its bracelets.
210. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)
(internal citations omitted).
211. Id. at 242.
212. Id. at 236.
213. Id. From this determination, the Court concluded that the news gathering
process which "has all the attributes of property necessary for determining that a
misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair competition because contrary to good
conscience." Id. at 240.
214. Id. at 242. The Court extrapolated a cause of action for unfair competition by
equating the fraud in traditional passing off cases as being present in InternationalNews
Service in a more direct form:
In the present case the fraud upon [AP's] rights is more direct and obvious.
Regarding news matter as the mere material from which these two competing
parties are endeavoring to make money, and treating it, therefore, as quasi
property for the purposes of their business because they are both selling it as
such, defendants's conduct differs from the ordinary case of unfair
competition in trade principally in this that, instead ofselling its own goods
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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[International News Service], by its very act, admits that it is taking
material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which
is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in
appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where
it has not sown... The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of
equity out not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition
25
in business. 1
3. Justice Holmes's Concurrence
Justice Holmes had already addressed the issue of identical copying of an
item, a zither, which was unpatented. Justice Holmes wrote:
Under such circumstances [of no patent protection for the zither] the
defendant has the same right that the plaintiff has to manufacture
instruments in the present form, to imitate the arrangement of the
plaintiff's strings or the shape of the body. In the absence of a patent
the freedom of manufacture cannot be cut down under the name of
preventing unfair competition. All that can be asked is that
precautions shall be taken, so far as consistent with the defendant's
fundamental right to make and sell what it chooses, to prevent the
deception which no doubt it desires to practice.21 6
Justice Holmes had earlier provided several other indications of his
approach to intellectual property.

In DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v.

Masland,2 7 he stated, "[t]he word property as applied to trademarks and trade
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith."
Earlier, writing privately about copyright Justice Holmes said of copyright, "[i]t
would be intolerable if not limited in time and I think it would be hard to state
a basis for the notion which would not lead one far afield."218
In InternationalNews Service, Justice Holmes proposed a remedy based on
his assessment of the wrong committed, which he argued could have been

as those of [AP], it substitutes misappropriation in the place of
misrepresentation,and sells [AP's]goods as its own.

Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 239-40.

216. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901) (internal citations
omitted).
217. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); see also American Waltham Watch Co. v. United
States Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899).
218. HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS 53 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1961).
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corrected by proper labeling or by an injunction precluding publication
of the
21 9
news obtained from AP sources, absent such an acknowledgment.

D. The ContinuingDevelopment ofMisappropriation
1. Introduction
As the genesis of misappropriation, InternationalNews Service formedand continues to form-the basic contours of the doctrine of misappropriation
of publicly disclosed trade values. Indeed, the admonition in InternationalNews
Service that the defendant was "endeavoring to reap where it ha[d] not sown"
has become a trope for the reasoning contained in InternationalNews Service.
InternationalNews Service has become an imposed link between the modem
case law assessing unfair competition and the limits of protection absent
copyright or patent protection.
InternationalNews Service marked, in the early stages of its development
and before the limits on misappropriation imposed by preemption in state unfair
competition cases, an abrupt departure from unfair competition law as a cause
of action founded exclusively on trademark concerns of misrepresentation.220 At
the same time, the absence of clear precedent limited the doctrine's development.
As Professor Zachariah Chafee has stated, "[c]ertainly the cases before the
Associated Press case did not support [Justice] Pitney's sweeping
propositions."' And, in the period following InternationalNews Service,
"[s]ubsequent cases exhibit[ed] a lack of judicial enthusiasm for a full extension
of this [InternationalNews Service] doctrine.' '2
Summarizing the law of unfair competition in 1935, Chief Justice Hughes
stated:
'Unfair competition,' as known to the common law, is a limited
concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's

219. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, at 248-49 (1918)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).

220. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40
HARv. L. REV. 813, 813 (1927). Schechter observed:
These vigorous judicial expressions of impatience with the old theories of
trademark protection are indicative of a desire to keep abreast of and to serve
the needs of modem business. They reflect a consciousness of the need for
breadth and liberality in copying with the progressive ingenuity of
commercial depravity.
Id. at 813 (citing InternationalNews Service and other cases).
221. Zachariah Chafee Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1311

(1940).
222. PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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42

1999]

Olson:
Olson: Common Law
in the Digital Era
MISAPPROPRIATION
INMisappropriation
THE DIGITAL ERA

goods as those of a rival trader. In recent years, its scope has been
extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own-to
misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor.223
Despite the definite nature of that statement, misappropriation was a
disorderly cause of action at the time Chief Justice Hughes wrote his opinion; the
clear implication of the holding was that it permitted a finding of unfair
competition without a requirement that "passing off' be part of the claim. 24
Efforts to identify a common thread in the case law creating, restricting, or
applying the doctrine of misappropriation of publicly disclosed trade values
carry with them the unsatisfactory realization that InternationalNews Service is
less of a template defining misappropriation than it is a comfortable2 and
accessible starting point. However, it is self-limiting since it was decided as a
matter of general federal common law and accordingly did not have to meet a
preemption test.
2. The "Free Ride" Analysis of Misappropriation
Free riding "is the diversion of value from a business rival's efforts without
payment." Free riding was dismissed as ajustification in Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk Corp., where Judge Learned Hand effectively rejected InternationalNews
Service as having precedent. Judge Hand wrote: "While it is of course true that
the law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases where the occasion is
at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is decided. [International
News Service] appears to us such an instance; we think that226
no more was covered
than situations substantially similar to those then at bar.,
In Gotham Music Service v. D. & H. Music PublishingCo.,227 the plaintiff
renamed "Gambler's Blues," a composition in the public domain, calling the
song, "St. James Infirmary." The composition was advertised under this title,

223. A.L.A Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935)
(citing InternationalNews Service, 248 U.S. at 413). See generally Milton Handler,
ProductSimulation:A Right ora Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1183 (1964).
224. See Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d
705, 709 (Wis. 1974).
225. Prof. Benjamin Kaplan aptly referred to InternationalNews Service as a
"celebrated solecism." Benjamin Kaplan, Performer'sRight and Copyright: The Capitol
Records Case, 69 HARV. L. REV. 409,428 (1956).
226. 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929); see also Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198
F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) ("[T]he logic of the [InternationalNews Service] rationale
has not been extended to the design situation.").
227. 181 N.E. 57, 58 (N.Y. 1932).
228. Id. at 57.
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referring to a hospital unnamed in the original composition. 9 The defendant
published the same composition, also using the title "St. James Infirmary."23
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of the title, thereby acknowledging the
right of the defendant to use a public domain work but arguing for protection of
its advertising expenditures inherent in the title it had created."' The New York
Court of Appeals declined to protect trade values created by the advertising,
emphasizing the public domain status of the work.232 The immediate effect of
the decision was to clarify that when a plaintiff elected to promote and invest in
a work in the public domain, it did so without any assurance that it would be able
to capitalize on its entire expenditure.
In discussing Gotham Music, a survey of unfair competition concluded:
"The 'free ride' doctrine implicit in the AssociatedPresscase has been extended
but seldom to the unconscionable appropriation of a competitor's advertising and
the decision in the present
case is likely to make such an extension even more
'' 33
difficult in the future. 2
Free riding was accepted as a justification for a finding of misappropriation
based on the recognition that if a required investment were captured by a
competitor, the first mover would not make the investment on a continued
basis.2 4 A paradox arises in the misappropriation context because absent
protection copying of publicly disclosed trade values is deemed essential to free
and vigorous competition. Because InternationalNews Service was supported
with a limited conceptual analysis, the attraction of the free ride approach is that
it has provided a means of separating actionable misappropriation, often
involving systematic 5 copying, from cases involving permissible copying. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, did not find misappropriation in a case
involving the use of customer lists because it considered the use distinguishable
from the copying of news or sound recordings, where the copying involved the
"fruit of the final product," and "[t]he effect of these cases upon the original

229. Id. at 58.
230. Id.
231. Id.

232. Id.; ef Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921).
233. Developments in the Law-Unfair Competition-1932,46 HARV. L. REV.
1171, 1174-75 (1932-33).
234. The "free-rider" argument is accepted as a justification for imposing
restrictions in a vertical distribution relationship because "without restrictions a
manufacturer would not be able to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the
kind of investment of capital and labor necessary to distribute the product." Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,485 (1992).

235. See Metro Assoc. Servs., Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F. Supp 224,
236 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (holding that for the copying of uncopyrighted advertisements to
be actionable as misappropriation it must be "regular, systematic, and deliberate" in
character).
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creator of the product was immediate and direct. The defendant took things of
great value from the organization that created the product. ' 6 International
News Service has been considered a codification of the free ride doctrine in cases
when the copied property is deemed to be of an "exceptional nature" so that
recovery is permitted in this limited circumstance.
In H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y v. Siemens Medical Systems 7 the Second
Circuit declined to interpret New York law238 to create a "free ride" tort where
a mail order firm referred prospective customers to retailer's showrooms to view
equipment.' 9 The court held that such an expansion of New York law was
inappropriate for a federal court ruling in diversity. 240 However, in recent years,
common law misappropriation has been supplemented by statutory protection
which often incorporates common law elements.
E. Statutory Misappropriation
1. Introduction
Traditionally, misappropriation was a creation of equity not dependent on
a statutory formula for its existence. However, statutes prohibiting
misappropriation,24' which ordinarily supplement rather than supersede cases
defining misappropriation, provide statutory guidance on prohibited activities,
as well as defined remedies.
For example, California's statute prohibiting plug molding24 2 forbids the
creation of production molds from an existing product; 243 several other states

236. Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W.2d 242,252 (Wis. 1978).
237. 879 F.2d 1005, 1025 (2d Cir. 1989).
238. In Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), the Second Circuit observed that the New York law of
unfair competition is a "tort [which] is adaptable and capacious" but warned that "such

an amorphous cause of action is capable of mischievous application." Id. at 1005.
239. H.L. Hayden, 879 F.2d at 1014.
240. Id. at 1025.
241. Statutes prohibiting plug molding, considered infra note 244 and
accompanying text, have been adopted by a number of states, and may prohibit plug
molding in either all products, or specific products, such as boat hulls.
242. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17300 (West 1997).
243. In an unreported decision, Summerford Racing, Inc. v. Shadow Boat, Inc.,
Blount Chancery No. 122, 1986 WL 13043 (Tenn. Ct. App. November 21, 1988), the

Tennessee Court of Appeals held a cause of action was not stated under the Tennessee
mold statute which prohibited copies made from a direct molding process because the
precise terms of the statute, prohibiting the direct copying of any manufactured item were
not violated. This was because the plaintiffs hull, derived from a wrecked boat, was
used only as a partial base for a production mold, and the original configuration of the
hull was altered, rendering the defendant's hull neither a duplicate of the plaintiff's hull,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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have adopted a similar approach but have limited application of the statute to
boat hulls. 2" Plug molding, a process in which the existing product is used to
create a production mold, saves the copyist not only the actual cost of the design,
but also the cost of translating the design into a production mold through a
sculpting process.245
2. Economic Analysis of Misappropriation
At the heart of the economic dimension of misappropriation is the degree
of appropriability a product represents, which is a function of how quickly and
how completely the product can be copied. This calculation identifies the value
of investing in innovative or labor intensive efforts which can be copied.
Because copying is less expensive than innovating or originating a product, a
high degree of appropriability will lead to less activity in products which are
easily copied, thereby preventing the investment in their creation from being
effectively recaptured.246
There is also the element of economic analysis involving the efficient
allocation of resources. As the court in Cardtoons v. MajorLeague Baseball
Players 7 observed, "[w]ithout the artificial scarcity created by publicity rights,
identities would be commercially exploited until the marginal value of each use
is zero." Accordingly, the legal protection of publicity is the means by which the
publicity value of an identity is preserved and its value captured by the rationing
process inherent in limiting the use of a valuable identity.

F. The Evolution ofMisappropriation
Misappropriation evolved out of a series of opinions, often revolving
around New York law. For example, in Grove Pressv. CollectorsPublications,
Inc.,2" the court was presented with a publication reproduced on a public domain
work given minor editorial modifications and reset in new type. 249 Because the

nor the plaintiff's boat used as a plug in the fabrication of the defendant's boat. Id. at 3.
244. Florida and Tennessee have boat hull molding statutes. However, the Florida
statute was held unconstitutional by both the Florida Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of the United States in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
245. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So. 2d 220, 223 (Fla.
1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 141 (1989); see also Gladstone v. Hillel, 250 Cal. Rptr. 372, 379
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (involving jewelry maker's molds in which the court approved the
introduction of an expansive record supporting the plaintiff s contentions that his molds
were misappropriated).
246. U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, USING FEDERAL R&D TO

PROMOTE COMMERCIAL INNOVATION: A SPECIAL STUDY 13 (1988).

247. 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996).
248. 264 F. Supp. 603 (D. Cal. 1967).
249. Id. at 605.
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work was in the public domain, the relief granted was restricted to a prohibition
from reproducing the work through a photographic reproduction of the Grove
Press edition but "[s]ince the Grove edition [was] not copyrightable,
[d]efendants [were] free to copy the same so long as the method of copying [did]
not constitute unfair competition."2 50 The misappropriation present in Grove
involved an actual displacement of sales since a sale by Collector's Publications
was, at least in terms of the text of the work, a sale potentially made by Grove
Press.
In NationalFootballLeague v. Governor of Delaware,"1 a lottery based
upon NFL games was deemed an insufficient basis for misappropriation relief.

The court concluded that since the lottery used only publicly disseminated game
schedules and scores, "[t]his fact distinguishes the situation in International
News Service."'z 2 To prevent a "forced association with gambling[,]" the lottery
was required to use a disclaimer."
A more direct application of the misappropriation doctrine was presented
by the use of the venerable Dow Jones Industrial Index by an exchange which
proposed to base an index on it. The index was the subject of several law suits,
including one which asserted misappropriation as a basis for recovery.2 Dow
Jones brought a copyright action against the Chicago Board of Trade in federal
district court in New York. The district court denied Dow Jones's motion for a
preliminary injunction, holding that the copying of the index's list of component
stocks had not resulted in irreparable harm.s
A similar action was brought by the compiler of the Standard and Poor's
500 Stock Index against an exchange which sought to trade a futures contract
based on the index, a "broad-based, weighted compilation of 500 common stocks
which is calculated by S&P and is designed to measure the overall performance
of the stock market., 216 The index had already been licensed to the Chicago

250. Id. at 607 (emphasis added). Misappropriation would not be present if the
copying of the public domain work were not photographic. See H.W. Wilson Co. v.
National Library Service Co., 402 F. Supp. 456,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This "copyingmisappropriation" distinction has importance in the development of federal preemption
of misappropriation, and is discussed infra notes 292-93.
251. 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
252. Id. at 1377.
253. Id. A federal statute has since banned a lottery or other forms of gambling
based upon sporting events, subject to an exception for certain gambling activities
existing at the time of enactment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704 (1994).
254. Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
255. Id. at 123. The court expressly noted that the unfair competition issues were
pending before the Illinois courts. Id.
256. Standard & Poors Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704,706 (2d Cir.
1982).
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Mercantile
Exchange, a use for which Standard and Poor's received a licensing
7
fee.
Although the Exchange argued that its use of the index as the settlement
price was similar to an individual's use of the index to assess performance of a
personal portfolio, the Second Circuit disagreed and sustained a preliminary
injunction against its use by the Exchange.25 8 The grounds for the injunction
included a claim for misappropriation." The Second Circuit stated: "We
simply note that at a minimum S&P's claim of misappropriation presents
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation."2' A misappropriation claim requires an assessment of what is being
misappropriated. One conclusion is that "[b]y using the S&P 500, the
Commodity Exchange could free ride on the good will and reputation for
'261
independence that the index has in the minds of the investing public.
Further development of the misappropriation doctrine occurred in the
context of architectural designs and plans. Federal preemption of state
protection, however, precludes granting protection for the copying of building
designs because a state may not grant protection against the mere copying of a
262
design.
Major development of the misappropriation doctrine occurred in the context
of sound recordings, which were not protected by federal law until 1972.263
Indeed, one of the earliest misappropriation cases involved gramophone disks
but the court, while considering the question novel, based resolution of the case
on the copying of labels and marks. 264 F. T.C. v. Orient Music Roll Co.,265
decided shortly after International News Service, is perhaps the earliest
application of the misappropriation doctrine to a situation where the duplication
of a sound recording was deemed to constitute misappropriation.

Misappropriation of sound recordings represents the most comprehensive
body of case law in the misappropriation area?' and one which, given the limits

257. Id. at 710.
258. Id. at711.
259. Id.
260. Id.

261. Douglas G. Baird, Common Law IntellectualProperty and the Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411, 427 (1983).
262. See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1494
(11th Cir. 1990). Copying of a building design is ordinarily the essence of the
originating designer's or builder's complaint.
263. This protection is only for works fixed in a master after February 15, 1972.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1994).

264. See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904);

see also Fonotipa v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
265. 2 F.T.C. 176 (1919).
266. See, e.g., Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (Ili. App. Ct. 1970); Gai Audio v. CBS, Inc., 340
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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on preemption of sound recordings by federal statute, provides the most
analytical assessment of the development of the misappropriation doctrine apart
from the "hot news" context. In Metropolitan Opera Association v. WagnerNichols RecorderCorp., New York law was applied to the reproduction of opera
broadcasts that had been recorded without authorization. 267 The court stated:
[T]he law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the ground of
direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property
rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected from any
form of unfair invasion or infringement and from any form of
commercial immorality, and a court of equity will penetrate and
restrain every guise resorted to by the wrongdoer.268
A further elaboration of this reasoning was contained in CBS, Inc. v.
Melody Recordings,Inc.,269 wherein the court held:
The commercial injury ensues because defendants have accomplished
this [creation of a marketable sound recording] at a minimal cost and
then sold their 'original' duplicates for a substantial profit. The
actionable unfairness of this practice inheres in a combination of
factors-the substantial investment of time, labor, money and creative
resources in the product by plaintiff, the utilization of the actual
product by defendant, the misappropriation or use of the appropriated

A.2d 736 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Liberty UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d
414, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); CBS, Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,
Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937); Twentieth Century Fox Record Corp. v. Yes Co., 194
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 91 (W.D. Wash. 1997).
267. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950); see also Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest
Publ'g Co., 267 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945-46 (App. Div. 1966) (appropriation of direct
competitor's investment in compiling information); cf Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV
Broadcasting, Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); National Exhibition Co. v. Pass,
143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30
N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
268. 101 N.Y.S.2d at492.
269. 341 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); see also Liberty/UA, 180
S.E.2d at 414; CBS, Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 189 S.E.2d 305, 309 (S.C. 1972);
Capitol Records, 264 N.E.2d at 876; Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926,
928 (D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1912) (holding the copyright law prevented the duplication of a
perforated piano roll, a ruling that was incorrect); Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392,394 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v.
Armstrong, 132 F. 711,712 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (copying the distinctive appearance of
a sound recording, its original catalog number, and duplicating the recording as deemed
unfair competition).
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product by defendant in competition with plaintiff, and commercial
damage to plaintiff.27
Record piracy cases recognize that the appropriation being committed occurs at
the point where profit would be made, not at an intermediate step in the process
of developing a product.27 Thus, record piracy captures the expenditures in the
artistic development process as well as the marketing and promotion process."
These cases also recognized the limits of the misappropriation doctrine in
the context of sound recordings and confined the misappropriation doctrine to
duplication of the arrangementof a composition.273 However, the rerecording
of well known recordings using public domain arrangements is not actionable,
so long as representations made in comparing the original records and the
rerecordings are accurate."
Misappropriation's reach, independent of considerations of the product
involved, was the basis for the decision in Toho v. Sears,Roebuck & Co. 275 In
Toho, the court recognized that to permit a cause of action for misappropriation
of a trademark would result in the conversion of the trademark infringement
cause of action from one based on confusion to one based on use, a dramatic
expansion of the trademark protection.
G. Misappropriationand Choice ofLaw
Because InternationalNews Service was a diversity suit brought in federal
court, the law applied, prior to the landmark decision in Erie Railroad v.

270. 341 A.2d at 354.
271. See, e.g., GAI Audio, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 340 A.2d 736, 748 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1975); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d
705, 710 (Wis. 1974).
272. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 806 (Ct. App. 1969).
273. See, e.g., Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904,908 (S.D. Cal.
1950) (InternationalNews Service confined to situations analogous to the systematic
news-gathering operation); Miller v. Universal Pictures, Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1961)
(imitation of "Glen Miller" sound by rerecording not actionable).
269. See Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820-21 (N.Y. 1975)
(holding that while there was a right to duplicate arrangements of a renowned
big band orchestra leader, trial was required on the separate claim that Time-Life
had damaged the plaintiff's reputation with inferior recordings).
275. 645 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law); accord Sykes
Lab. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elects.,
564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983). See generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech: ConstitutionalImplications of the Emerging Rationalesfor the Protectionof

Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 207.
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Tompkins,276 was general federal common law.277 This approach had been
mandated since 1842 when, in Swift v Tyson,278 the Supreme Court directed
application of "the general principles and doctrines of commercial
jurisprudence" in diversity actions in lieu of state decisional law. The Supreme
Court summarized the governing approach in identifying applicable law shortly
after Swift:
The questions under our consideration are questions of general
commercial law, and depend upon the construction of a contract of
insurance, which is by no means local in its character, or regulated by
any local policy or customs. Whatever respect, therefore, the
decisions of State tribunals may have on such a subject, and they
certainly are entitled to great respect, they cannot conclude the
judgment of this court. On the contrary, we are bound to interpret this
instrument according to our own opinion of its true intent and objects,
aided by all the lights which can be obtained from all external sources
whatsoever; and if the result to which we have arrived differs from
that of these learned State courts, we may regret it, but it cannot be
permitted to alter our judgment.279

276. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

277. In InternationalNews Service, the Supreme Court did not cite any authority
or source for its admonition that a competitor may not "reap where it has not sown."
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918); see also J.I.
Case Plow Works v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 155 N.W. 128, 134 (Wis. 1915)
("The legal principles which are controlling here are simply the principles of old fashion
honesty. One man may not reap where another has sown, nor gather where another has
strewn.").
278. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERiCAN
LAW 30-35, 60-61, 93 (1977). 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE: WORKING
PAPERS AND SUBcoMMITTEE REPORTS 15-23 (July 1, 1990) (providing general

background of the Swift decision and the consequences of its reversal in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
Earlier, on circuit, Justice Story had expressed his position on the determination of
applicable law. See Gordon v. Hobart, 10 F. Cas. 795, 797 (C.C.D.Me. 1836) (No.
5609); Flagg v. Mann, 9 F. Cas. 202,223 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 4847).

279. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, 510 (1842).
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Erie changed this by requiring federal courts to apply state decisional law 8 in
diversity actions, 281 as well as to claims decided under pendent jurisdiction,28

280. While a state supreme court's most recent decision constitutes primary
authority, Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1989),
the sources of state law include intermediate appellate courts since "it is clear that '[i]n
the absence of a state supreme court ruling, a federal court must follow an intermediate
state court decision unless other authority convinces the federal court that the state
supreme court would decide otherwise."' Jordan v. Shattuck Nat'l Bank, 868 F.2d 383,
386 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 996 (10th Cir. 1981)).
281. See Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942);
Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457,468 (1941).

Erie also requires the application of state conflict of law rules as well. See Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elect. Mfg.

Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). However, the parties have the burden of asserting this rule and
"[w]hen the parties fail to consider the choice of law in a diversity case, the substantive

law of the forum is presumed to control." Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 681 n.33 (7th Cir. 1986); accordNational Ass'n
of Sporting Goods Wholesalers, Inc. v. F.T.L. Marketing Corp., 779 F.2d 1281, 1285
(7th Cir. 1985). On appeal, a failure to raise objections to the choice of law issue results
in the issue being waived. See Kritikos v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 821 F.2d 418, 421 (7th
Cir. 1987). The similarity of authorities may result in the application of general
principles without applying choice of law rules. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info.
Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir. 1987); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 382 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977); American Heritage
Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 15 (5th Cir. 1974).
Consistent with the limited role of a federal court in applying state law, a federal
court will be generally reluctant to expand the applicable case law, and an innovative
theory, not grounded in applicable state precedents, will ordinarily be declined to be
adopted. For example, in Weinstein v. University ofllinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.3,
1097 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff urged adoption of droit moral as a matter of Illinois
law. Noting that droitmoralhas not been adopted in the United States, the court rejected
the invitation, stating that "[a] federal court is not about to foist so novel a principle on
Illinois... [where there is] no reason to suspect that the courts of Illinois are just about
to adopt an approach that no American jurisdiction follows as a general matter."
Similarly, inH.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1025 (2d Cir.
1989), the court declined to extend New York's unfair competition law to create a "free
rider" tort in an action seeking damages for alleged referrals by a discounter of customers
to a plaintiff's retail showroom to view equipment before purchasing from discounter by
mail. Accord Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner, 824 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Shaw v.
Republic Drill Corp., 810 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum
Co., 801 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1986).
282. Supplemental jurisdiction permits the assertion of state unfair competition
claims when joined with a "substantial and related claim" under copyright, patent or
trademark laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b) (1994). A federal district court has substantial
discretion to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial.
See Enercomp, Inc. v. McCorhill Pub., Inc., 873 F.2d 536, 545 (2d Cir. 1989);
Dovenmuehle v. Gilldom Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 699 n.2 (7th Cir.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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when state law claims are joined with a federal cause of action under patent,
copyright, or federal trademark.283 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,214 the

Supreme Court stated that if the claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact" and are sufficiently similar that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding[,]" the claims may be joined.
Pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs, however, is discretionary and the district court
is directed to apply a series of criteria in determining whether to retain state law
claims. 2 5 Alternatively, except in the area of copyright and patent infringement
actions where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, an action may be
filed in state court.286
The application of the law of specific states in misappropriation actions has,
however, been frustrated by the fact that state law is often nonexistent287 and
federal precedents continue to define the elements of an unfair competition
claim. 288 The paucity of state precedent 89 has resulted in the development of a

1989); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1348 (7th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, summary judgment on federal claims will permit dismissal of pendent state
claims. See U.S. v. King Features Entertainment, Inc., 843 F.2d 394,400 (9th Cir. 1988);
Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
283. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (199). Judge Friendly wrote that a cause of action under
Federal copyright laws arises:
if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act... or
asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at the very least and perhaps
more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that
federal principles control the disposition of the claim.
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 915 (1965); accord Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380,

1381 (9th Cir. 1988); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1987).
284. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
285. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988); see also
Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 1984)
(pendent jurisdiction in copyright and unfair competition action).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court disapproved the extension of the Gibbs
doctrine to pendent parties, "that is, jurisdiction over parties not named in any claim that

is independently cognizable by the federal court." Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,
549 (1989). In turn, supplemental jurisdiction is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
286. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). For a primer on state court litigation of
intellectual property actions, see generally Ted Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less
Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademarkor Copyright Disputes, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 703 (1988).
287. See, e.g., National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499,
501-02 (D. Mass. 1942); Goebel Brewing Co. v. Esslingers, Inc., 95 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1953).
288. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 n.1 (1938) (stating that
"[m]ost of the issues in this case involve questions of common law and hence are within
the scope of [Erie]. But no claim has been made that the local law is any different from

the general law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal
precedents"). Because unfair competition claims involving trademarks or trademarkPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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common set of precedents that frequently defines the major elements 29
of
misappropriation, 29 although there may also be statutory aspects of a claim. '

H. Remedies in Copying Cases
Ordinarily, relief must be carefully structured to permit copying except in
the most carefully tailored confines "[s]ince a prohibition on copying even a
nonfunctional feature of an article may impede competition or engender added
marketing costs. '
In the context of confusion, full labeling-thereby eliminating the
confusion-is a sufficient remedy and one which
avoids the federal preemption
293
of state protection of intellectual property.

related issues are premised on confusion, see, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts v.
Creative House Promotions, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1435, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd
on othergrounds, 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), the applicable statutory or case law
authorities share a strong common denominator. See, e.g., International Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the
Lanham Act and Califomia law of unfair competition "are substantially congruent").
Accord SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 155, 1058 (3d Cir. 1980)
(stating that New Jersey and federal law of unfair competition similar); Emilio Pucci
Societa a Responsibilita v. Pucci Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1543 n.2 (N.D. Il1.1988)
(stating that the Lanham Act and New York law of unfair competition are "similar").
The enactment of statutory prohibitions against so-called plug molding was
nullified in 1989. See infra notes 367-73 and accompanying text.
289. See Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir.
1956) (Clarke, C.J., concurring); Jewish Employment & Vocational Serv., Inc. v.
Pleasantville Educ. Supply Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 613, 622 n.7 (E.D. PA. 1982).
290. Another approach would be to pass a federal unfair competition statute; that
approach was proposed and would have, in part, created a uniform authority to address
the "patchwork of conflicting views" resulting from Erie had the effort been successful.
Unfair Commercial Activities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Financeof the House Committee on InterstateandForeign Commerce, 88th Cong., 21

(1964).
291. CAL. Clv. CODE § 3369(3) (1997) condemns "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business practice." See McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32 (1951) (holding that in
action involving credit information, applicable principles of California law are those of
InternationalNews Service); Stanley v. CBS, Inc., 221 P.2d 73 (1950).

292. Brief of the United States Amicus Curiae, Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844 (1982) (Nos. 80-2192 & 81-11).
293. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947);
William R.Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1924); Bose Corp.
v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1972).
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON MISAPPROPRIATION: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF
STATE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A. Introduction
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution limits the ability
of states to enact laws inconsistent with federally determined objectives through
express preemption, through an implicit signal that Congress intends to occupy
an area, or through the actual conflict of state laws with federal laws.294
B. The LearnedHand Opinions
Judge Learned Hand, in a series of influential opinions, shaped a significant
limitation on misappropriation that would provide the conceptual foundation of
the Sears-Compco doctrine,295 the continuing development of federal
constitutional limitations on state protection of intellectual property, and the
doctrine of misappropriation protection for publicly disclosed trade values.296
In RCA ManufacturingCo. v. Whiteman,297 Judge Hand, commenting on
InternationalNews Service, stated:
[W]e see no reason why the same acts that unconditionally dedicate
the common-law copyright in works copyrightable under the act,
should not do the same in the case of works not copyrightable.
Otherwise it would be possible, at least pro tanto, to have the
advantage of dissemination of the work at large, and to retain a
perpetual though partial, monopoly in it.
[As to InternationalNews Service,] [t]hat much discussed decision
really held no more than that a western newspaper might not take
advantage of the fact that it was published some hours later than

294. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council ofNew Orleans, 911 F.2d 993,
998 (5th Cir. 1990).
295. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co., v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
296. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has, more recently,
accepted misappropriation under New York law. See Flexitized, Inc. v. National
Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that New York law allows
recovery "in a wide variety of situations to insure that 'one may not misappropriate the
results of the skill, expenditures and labors of a competitor') (quoting Electrolux Corp.
v. Val-Worth, Inc., 161 N.E.2d 197, 203 (N.Y. 1959)), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
See generallyNote, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction: A False Step in the
Development of the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444
(1971).
297. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
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papers in the east, to copy the news which the plaintiff had collected
at its own expense. In spite of some general language it must be
confined to that situation.298
Similarly, Judge Hand characterized InternationalNewsService as a case which
"[b]ecause of the complexity of the facts the case is sui generis. Even there the
decision was based largely upon fraud." 299 Judge Hand's most definitive
statement of the effect of applying federal preemption principles to
misappropriation is in his dissent in CapitolRecords, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp.3" Judge Hand, observing that sound recordings were tangible objects,
said that "there should be no doubt that this is within the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution" and accordingly foreclosed from state protection the recordings
since they were within the subject matter of the copyright act. 30 1 Judge Hand
reasoned: "[u]niformity was one of the principal interests to be gained by
devolving upon the Nation the regulation of this subject."3' 2 Further, given the
absence of copyright protection, "the alternative [pursuant to misappropriation]
is a monopoly unlimited both in time and in user." 303 The reasoning anticipated
the underpinnings that would be the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions a
decade later.3°

298. Id. at 89-90.
299. See also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that InternationalNews Service "is to be strictly confined to the facts then at
bar"); National Comics Publication v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir.
1951) (stating that InternationalNews Service "is authority only for the situation there
at bar, as has been over and over decided"); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d
279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (stating that InternationalNews Service covered "no more...
than situations substantially similar to those then at bar. The difficulties of
understanding it otherwise are insuperable."), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930). See
also Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1959)
("Because of the complexity of the facts the case is sui generis. Even there the decision
was based largely upon fraud.").
300. 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, C.J., dissenting).

301. Id.
302. Id. at 667.
303. Further, the effect of a State scheme of protection within the federal subject
matter area would interfere with a consistent national rule: "Uniformity was one of the
principal interests to be gained by devolving upon the Nation the regulation of this
subject." Id. at 667.
304. The Supreme Court would agree with the majority in the Capitol Records
case, however, and permit state statutory protection for sound recordings. See Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568 n.27 (1973). Recently, "hybrid rights" have been
accorded to live, unfixed recordings under an "anti-bootlegging" statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319A (Supp. 1H 1997); United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11 th Cir.
1999).
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From these decisions emerged a right to copy a product's °6exterior
configuration0 5 once the design of the product has been made public.
C. Sears-Compco
Two Supreme Court opinions demarcate the limits of allowable state
protection and identify the permissible boundaries, as elaborated by later
Supreme Court cases, of misappropriation, which in contemporary law has
become a precedential authority more strongly marked by its limits than by its
affirmative requirements.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,3 7 Sears copied a pole lamp which
had originally been covered by both design and utility patents by Stiffel.0 8
Sears's retail price was approximately Stiffel's wholesale price.3" Although the
patents were invalidated by the district court, protection was still granted against
reproduction of the pole lamp design, despite an attempt by Sears to pass off its
lamps as Stiffel products. 310 The Supreme Court reversed:
Sears has been held liable here for unfair competition because of a
finding of likelihood of confusion based only on the fact that Sears'
lamp was copied from Stiffel's unpatented lamp and that consequently
the two looked exactly alike. Of course there could be 'confusion' as
to who had manufactured these nearly identical articles. But mere
inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough
to support an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied.
305. See, e.g., Swanson Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 500, 503
(2d Cir. 1945) (holding that it is not actionable unfair competition to copy plaintiffs
purses and sell duplicates, absent secondary meaning); A.C. Gilbert Co., v. Shemitz, 45

F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that unfair competition not present since the
defendants have "the right to copy the ... design slavishly so long as they [do] not
represent that the goods sold" were manufactured by the plaintiff).
306. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930). The Court in Cheney, stated that InternationalNews
Service:
[C]overed [no more] than situations substantially similar to those then at bar.

The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable. We are to
suppose that the court meant to create a sort of common-law patent or
copyright for reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly conflict with the
scheme which Congress has for more than a century devised to cover the
subject-matter.

Id.
307. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
308. Id. at 226.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 226-27.
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Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled
as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as
to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading
purchasers as to the source of the goods. But because of the federal
patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and
uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award
damages for such copying.31'
A similar situation was presented in Compco Corp. v. Day-BriteLighting,
Inc.,a" 2 where protection under Illinois law had been accorded against the
reproduction of a fluorescent lighting fixture:
As we have said in Sears, while the federal patent laws prevent a State
from prohibiting the copying and selling of unpatented articles, they
do not stand in the way of state law, statutory or decisional, which
requires those who make and sell copies to take precautions to identify
the products as their own. A State of course has power to impose
liability upon those who, knowing that the public is relying upon an
original manufacturers' reputation for quality and integrity, deceive
the public by palming off their copies as the original. That an article
copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way,
that the design is 'nonfunctional' and not essential to the use of either
article, that the configuration of the article copied may have a
'secondary meaning' which identifies the maker to the trade, or that
there may be 'confusion' among purchasers as to which article is
which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying
a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and
regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others
can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual
acts of copying and selling.3" 3

311. Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted).
312. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
313. Id. at 234. 238.
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Sears-Compco had a sweeping impact in the misappropriation context?' 4
and was initially perceived as having impeded the development of the
misappropriation doctrine, a barrier from which the Court
315 retreated in later cases,
providing a "maze for practitioners to meander in."
"D.CopyrightAct of 1976
1. Introduction

Section 301(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is critical to federal limitations
on misappropriation. This provision, which helps to effectuate the elimination
of the dual system of copyright, 3 6 only allows states to grant relief for "activities
violating legal or equitable rights which are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106. ' '317 Section 301(b) is, when read in conjunction with its companion
provisions,3 8 a prohibition against state protection which would result in the
same remedy as federal copyright law and accordingly protect rights identical to
those protected by federal copyright law. The reach of Section 301(b), limited
by a confused legislative history,319 has provided uncertain guidance to a basic
premise underpinning the Copyright Act of 1976.

314. CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1967) (asserting that
InternationalNews Service "has been clearly overruled" by Sears-Compco). A later

opinion, DeCostav. CBS, Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1073 (1976), observed that its first opinion had been characterized as according "an
expansive reading to Sears and Compco" and "Goldstein tells us that we were, in our
interpretation of the preemptive reach of the Copyright Clause, over-inclusive."
315. 1974 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 90 (1975).
316. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPnETITION § 38 cmt. e (1995). The
Reporter's Note, provides that "[s]tate protection that interferes with the balance struck
by federal copyright law is presumably subject to preemption even if not specifically
prohibited under § 301." Id.
The Copyright Act of 1909 expressly preserved common law copyright for
unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. § 2 provided:

Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the limit the right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his
consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
17 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
317. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994).

318. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
319. See infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
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2. The Legislative History of Section 301
An earlier version of Section 301320 provided examples of state unfair
competition actions which would not be preempted, "including rights against
misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights, breaches of
contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation
and deception [sic] trade practices such as passing off and false
representations. '32' The House Judiciary Committee Repor3 22 stated:
'Misappropriation' is not necessarily synonymous with copyright
infringement and thus a cause of action labeled as 'misappropriation'
is not preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right within the
general scope of copyright section 106 [delineating the rights of the
copyright owner] nor on a right equivalent thereto. For example, state
law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional
principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized
appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e. not the literary
expression) constituting 'hot' news, whether in the traditional mold of
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,248 U.S. 215 (1918),
or in the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or
financial data bases. Likewise, a person having no trust or other
relationship with the proprietor of a computerized data base should not
be immunized from sanctions against electronically or
cryptographically breaching the proprietor's security arrangements and
accessing the proprietor's data. The unauthorized data access which
should be remediable might also be achieved by the intentional
interception of data transmissions by wire, microwave or laser
transmissions, or by the common unintentional means of 'crossed'
telephone lines occasioned by errors in switching. The proprietor of
data displayed on the cathode ray tube of a computer terminal should
be afforded protection against printouts by third parties (with or
without improper access), even if the data are not copyrightable. For
example, the data may not be copyrighted because they are not fixed
in a tangible medium of expression.

320. See S. REP.No. 94-473 (1975).
321. 122 CONG. REc. H32,015 (1976). See Howard Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation,and Preemption Constitutionaland Statutory Limits of State Law
Protection, 11 SUPREME CT. REv. 509, 546-48 (1983) (concluding, after
comprehensively reviewing the evolution of this provision that "[t]o say that this leaves
the legislative history of preemption of the misappropriation doctrine in a state of
confusion is an understatement").
322. H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747-48.
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3. The Application of Section 301
The direct language of Section 301, combined with its legislative history,
has resulted in a two-part test for determining preemption of state causes of
action. The two-part test, as stated in Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes &

Gardner,Inc.," establishes that in order to be preempted and denied state
protection, a work must be within the subject matter of copyrighe24 and the
"rights granted under state law must be 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by Section 106 [of the
Copyright Act]."'

325

Accordingly, a misappropriation claim which is a

"reformulated" copyright claim will be preempted.326 Thus, "[t]o survive
preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights which are qualitatively
different from copyright rights .... The state claim must have an 'extra element'
which changes the nature of the action."327
The "extra element" text was applied in Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood 328 to
evaluate whether a claim of "commercial immorality" in a misappropriation
action was enough to avoid preemption. "Commercial immorality" in the district
court's characterization was:

323. 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see also Kregos v. Associated
Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994) ("In contrast [to

misappropriation claims], unfair-competition claims based upon breaches of confidential
relationships, breaches of fiduciary duties and trade secrets have been held to satisfy the
extra-element test and avoid § 301 preemption.").
324. The subject matter of copyright is expansive, since it applies to any work
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). That there are
portions of a work which consist of uncopyrightable material does not preclude the work
from being within the subject matter of copyright. See, e.g., Harper& Row, 723 F.2d
at 195; Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663,

675 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,480 U.S. 941 (1987). Live sports programming which
is recorded is "fixed" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Cable News Network,
Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 1480 n.16 (11th Cir. 1991).
325. Del Madera Properties,820 F.2d at 976 (quoting Harper & Row, 501 F.
Supp. at 850); Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674.
326. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1494 (1 lth
Cir. 1990) (preempting unfair competition claim based only upon allegations of copying
a house floorplan of a competing housebuilder). See generally 1 M. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF LrrERARY, MusICAL AND ARTIsTIC PROPERTY, AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 1.01 [B] at 1-10 to 1-12 (1999).
327. DelMaderaProperties,820 F.2d at 977 (citing Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood
& Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
328. 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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[A]n extra element in the same sense that awareness and intent are: it

alters the scope of the action but not its nature. That is, it would
permit the action to go forward when the infringing conduct is
immoral, but not when it is not immoral. The basic act which
constitutes the infringement of plaintiff's rights, however, is the same
as that of copyright.329
The "extra element" text was deemed incomplete by the Seventh Circuit in
an action involving a claim of publicity. In Baltimore Oriolesv. MajorLeague
330 the court emphasized that "the right of publicity is closely
BaseballPlayers,
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law.""33 Because the broadcast
baseball games were copyrighted, and the players had assigned their copyrights
to the teams which employed them, the court held that any publicity claims were
preempted based on the premise that the right asserted was within the subject
matter of federal copyright.
The divergence between the "extra element" test of Mayer and the
identification of state law goals under BaltimoreOrioleswas addressed in Nash
v. CBS, Inc.,332 in which the plaintiff author claimed that his theory on the
famous gangster, John Dillinger, was appropriated. Nash's theory contended
that another man, instead of Dillinger, was killed outside the Biograph Theater
in 1934. 333 The district court found that the television episode and Nash's
theory, as expressed in four books, were not3 3"substantially
similar" and granted
4
summary judgment on the copyright claim.

329. Id. at 1535.
330. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
331. Id. at 678-79. In applying this analysis, the court held that a right of privacy
would not be preempted while a right of publicity would be preempted. The court
explained:

It is true that rights of publicity and of privacy evolved from similar origins;
however, whereas the right of privacy protects against intrusions on seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, and casting an individual in a false light in the
public eye, the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized exploitation of
names, likenesses, personalities, and performances that have acquired value for the
very reason that they are known to the public.
Id.
332. 704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1989). An earlier opinion, 691 F. Supp. 140 (N.D.
Ill. 1988), held that Nash's books on John Dillinger contained a copyrightable story.
Nash alleged that an episode of a television program broadcast by CBS had copied his
theory that John Dillinger was alive and brought both a copyright claim and a
misappropriation claim.
333. 704 F. Supp. at 827.
334. Id. at 831.
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Nash contended that CBS practiced deception 3D 5 in using his Dillinger
stories, and that this deception supported both unfair competition and
misappropriation causes of action.336 In the context of preemption of the
misappropriation claim, the district court concluded that "commercial
immorality" was not sufficiently different to separate a misappropriation claim
from a copyright claim.337 Similarly, the district court ruled that the analysis
applied by the Seventh Circuit in Baltimore Orioles compelled the same
conclusion since the "'goal' underlying copyright law is the same as that driving
the tort of misappropriation: balancing the need to provide economic incentives
for authorship against the preservation of the freedom to imitate. ' 338 A further
element was involved, however, in reaching this conclusion. The House Report
accompanying Section 301131 caused the district court to conclude that only the
"'systematic' appropriation of 'hot news' or valuable stored information" or "the
existence of a special relationship between the parties" would preclude
preemption of the misappropriation claim.
Clearly, when deception is involved, as in an action for fraud, the cause of
action is not preempted. 340 The existence of an element of deception causes a
341 Phrased differently, federal
difference in "kind from copyright infringement."
"copyright law govems only copying." ' 2 Accordingly, "ifviolation of the state

335. Nash styled his claim "unfair competition" but identified Illinois's Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act in a supporting memoranda, a statute which contains a
"likelihood of confusion" requirement as an element of a cause of action. In turn, the
district court considered the confusion requirement an unnecessary element for a
copyright claim which only required proof of copying. Nash, 704 F. Supp. at 832.
336. Nash cited that leading Illinois case, Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983).
337. 704 F. Supp. at 834.
338. Id.
339. The House Report is considered supra note 322.
340. See Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989) (fraud
claim not preempted as requires misrepresentation claim).
341. Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, 479 N.E.2d 236, 238 (N.Y. 1985); see also
Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 463 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1984).
But see H20 Swimwear, Ltd. v. Lomas, 560 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 1990), where
a state claim based upon alleged copying of a swimsuit design was held not preempted
because clothing designs are not included within the subject matter of the Copyright Act
of 1976; the court distinguished Meyers on the basis that the design involved was a
design printed on fabric, and within the subject matter of the Copyright Act of 1976, as
opposed to a clothing design.
342. G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896,
904 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,508 U.S. 959 (1993). Compare Miles, Inc. v. Scripps
Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (declining to
recognize, under California law, an action for conversion based on the right to
commercialize a cell line) with Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497
(Cal. 1990) (denying individual conversion claim in cell line derived from his spleen,
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right is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction
'
or the like, there is no preemption."343
Similarly, trade secret protection was
deemed "uniquely valuable" for protecting computer programs, and the nature
of protection accorded qualitatively different from copyright, thereby
constituting an "extra element" that foreclosed preemption. 3" Central to the
operation of the preemptive statute is the protection provided by the Copyright
Act as contrasted with the preemption required by the statute. As the Fourth
Circuit has stated, "scope and protection are not synonyms. Moreover, the
shadow actually cast
by the Act's preemption is notably broader than the wing
345
of its protection.,
This two-part assessment requires that after the determination is made that
the subject matter of work sought to be protected falls within copyright, the court
must then assess, under the second part of the analysis, whether "a right defined
by state law may be abridged346by an-act which, in and of itself, would infringe
one of the exclusive rights."
This secondfactor supported a finding of no preemption in Wojnarowicz
v. American FamilyAssociation, 4 in which a preemption challenge was made
to the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act.348 In finding the challenge
unsustainable under the "extra element" test, the district court stated:
Although the rights to reproduce and to produce derivative work are
protected by the Copyright Act, section 14.03 of the New York
Artists' Authorship Rights Act as amended is indeed qualitatively
different than federal copyright law in both its aim and its elements.
The state Act endeavors to protect an artist's reputation from the
attribution to him of altered, defaced, mutilated or modified works of

but permitted to proceed on basis of lack of informed consent), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
936 (1991).
343. Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1984).
344. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). A
similar result was reached in Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
345. United States ex rel. Berge v. Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453,
1463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 301 (1997).
346. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.
1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); cf National Car Rental Sys. Inc. v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, 991 F.2d 426, 585 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861
(1993) (finding no preemption of contractually imposed license restrictions on
copyrighted software); Rano v. Sipa Press Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993) (preempting
state law which permits at-will termination of a contract with federal law prohibiting
termination at-will).
347. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). This case is described in the section on
moral rights, see supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
348. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (Consol. Supp. 1999).
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art. Moreover, a claim under this statute requires proof of elements
not required to prove copyright infringement, namely (a) the artwork
must be altered, defaced, mutilated or modified; (b) the altered,
defaced, mutilated or modified artwork must be attributed to the artist,
or displayed in such circumstances as to be reasonably understood to
be his work; and (c) this attribution must be reasonably likely to
damage the artist's reputation. While both plaintiff's state law and
copyright claims are based upon the same cropped reproductions

contained in the AFA pamphlet,
they are qualitatively different and
349
hence there is no preemption.

Sears-Compco gave rise to a sweeping determination by the First Circuit,
which held that InternationalNews Service "is no longer authoritative" having
"clearly been overruled" by Sears-Compco 3'0 and to the more restrained
conclusion that Sears-Compco precluded misappropriation actions for "mere
copying" of works in the public domain.351 In Goldstein v. California,352 the
Court, in refusing to preempt a California statute which prohibited the
duplication of sound records, considered the situation dissimilar to SearsCompco: "No restraint has been placed on the use of an idea or concept; rather,
petitioners and other individuals remain free to record the same composition in
precisely the same manner and with the same personnel as appeared on the
original recording."35 3 As framed in Goldstein, "a conflict would develop if a
State attempted to protect that which Congress intended to free from restraint or
to free that which Congress had protected. ''3 4 Goldstein accordingly permitted
concurrent protection of the subject matter of sound recordings so long as state
protection did not interfere with the federal statutory scheme.

349. Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 135-36 (internal citations omitted).

350. CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1007 (1967). See generally The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 282
(1973); Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV.
873, 886, 895-96 (1971).
351. See Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 874, 878 (Ct. App.
1982); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating
that Sears-Compco intended to "prevent protection outside of the copyright laws, of
works which Congress could have protected but chose not to"); Pet Needs, Inc. v. T.F.H.
Publications, Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (holding that
bookcover and book format are protected as distinctive trade dress). See generally

Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or A Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1212
(1964); Note, Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888
(1964); Note, Unfair Competition and the DoctrineofFunctionality,64 CoLUM. L. REV.
544 (1964).
352. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).

353. 412 U.S. at 571.
354. Id. at 559.
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After Sears-Compco,the effect of the federal preemption doctrine on the
status of trade secrets protected under state law was uncertain3 .. until the
Supreme Court's decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.3 6 In Kewanee
Oil,the Court perceived trade secrets as providing complimentary protection,
as
357
providing protection for inventions which patent law may not protect.
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than
the patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery
of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation
or reverse engineering, patent law operates 'against the world,'
forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a
significant length of time. The holder of a trade secret also takes a
substantial risk that the secret will be passed on to his competitors, by
theft or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a manner not easily
susceptible of discovery or proof. Where patent law acts as a barrier,
trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.3 58
The Supreme Court, in approving trade secret protection, concluded: "Certainly
the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of
another form of incentive to invention. ' '319 The Supreme Court cited with
approval the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co., 6' which distinguished between intrusion into
information available from reverse engineering of a product and violation of the
fiduciary dimension of confidential employer-employee relationships. The
remedy imposed by the district court, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
was to forbid the marketing of the defendant's tape player for two years,
representing the estimated time required to legitimately reverse engineer the
plaintiff's device.3 6'

355. Note, Trade Secrets After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356 (1967).
356. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
357. Id. at 487.
358. Id. at 489-90 (footnote and internal citations omitted).
359. Id. at 484.
360. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
361. A separate line of cases within Sears-Compco deals with limitations by
agreement of the right to copy items in the public domain. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969) (stating that"federal law requires that all ideas in general
circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid
patent"). A conceptually related issue was presented by Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S.
29 (1964). InAronson v. QuickPointPencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,262-63 (1979), the court
permitted enforcement of a royalty agreement for an unpatentable invention since it
furthered the federal objectives of providing an incentive to invent and to make a public
disclosure of the invention.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that parties are free to contract away the right
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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Although Goldstein and Kewanee have been characterized as intending no
departure from Sears-Compco, the acknowledgment in Goldstein that states

possess concurrent authority almost necessarily carried with it a suggestion that

the case 362
was intended as a moderation of the fullest applications of SearsCompco.

.The evolution of the preemption doctrine also involved the development of
the copying/misappropriation distinction.
An early challenge to the
comprehensiveness of the Sears-Compco doctrine was Truck Equipment Service
Co. v. FruehaufCorp.,363 in which the Eighth Circuit declared the statement in
Compco involving secondary meaning and "nonfunctional" elements" of a
truck exterior "dictum 3 6 since the discussion of those doctrines was not
essential to the holdings of the cases.
The law of trademark and the issues of functionality and
secondary meaning were not before the Court. The issue before the
Court was whether state law could extend the effective term of patent

to copy works in the public domain since "[t]he Sears/Compco doctrine nullifies a private
contract only if enforcement of the contract would conflict with the patent law."
Universal Gym Equip., Inc, v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
362. See, e.g., H.W. Wilson Co. v. National Library Serv. Co., 402 F. Supp. 456,
459 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) in which a protective legend, purporting to restrict duplication of
a published reference work, was held ineffective and state protection was held
unavailable to prevent duplication of a cumulative index compiled using information in
the plaintiff's publications. Sears and Compco were held to preclude state protection of
such a cumulative compilation. Further, the court characterized Goldstein as identifying
a distinction between allowable copying and unlawful misappropriation was deemed
inapplicable since the cumulative index which was the subject matter of the dispute was
not a mechanical copy of the existing publications. Id.
363. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also
Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886, (1964) (holding that common
law copyright was unaffected by Sears-Compco since common law copyright did not
extend to works in the public domain nor to those which were published).
364. The statement the Eighth Circuit was responding to was in Compco Corp. v.
Day-BriteLighting,Inc., 376 U.S. 234,238 (1964), where the Supreme Court said:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way,
that the design is 'nonfunctional' and not essential to the use of either article, that
the configuration of the article copied may have a 'secondary meaning' which
identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be 'confusion' among purchasers
as to which article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in
applying a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and
regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish a
basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
Accord Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982).
365. Fruehauf,536 F.2d at 1214.
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protection granted by the federal statutes. The focus of the Court was
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair
competition is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because
each is directed at a different purpose. The latter protects inventive
activity which, after a term of years, is dedicated to the public domain.
The former protects commercial activity which, in our society, is
essentially private .... Free competition is served in both cases.
Full and fair competition requires that those who invest time,
money and energy into the development of goodwill and a favorable
reputation be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment.
To protect TESCO against the misappropriation of the exterior
design [of its truck], portions of which are nonfunctional and which is
possessed of a secondary meaning, will be in furtherance of this
Congressional purpose. Contrary to the situation in Sears and
Compco, there is in the instant controversy no conflict with federal

statutory policy. Fruehauf s contention that it is privileged to copy the
exterior design of the [truck] must fail.3
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder CraftBoats, Inc. 367 resulted in the Supreme
Court revisiting the contours of the Sears-Compco doctrine. The Court reviewed
a Florida statute 68 which prohibited copying a boat hull by means of a direct
molding process; the copier of the hull was spared the expense of copying the
hull by other means permitted under the Florida statute. The Supreme Court,
after reviewing Sears-Compco, observed:
The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in Sears and Compco has
been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial debate. Read at their
highest level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand
for the proposition that the States are completely disabled from
offering any form of protection to articles or processes
which fall
69
within the broad scope of patentable subject matter.
The Supreme Court rejected that reading of its cases:

366. Fruehauf 536 F.2d at 1214-15 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
367. 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
368. Twelve states had antidirect molding statutes; nine states applied it only to
vessels or vessel components while California, Michigan and Tennessee applied it to any
item copied by a molding process. See David W. Carstens, Preemption of Direct
Molding Statutes: Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 192
(1990).
369. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (internal citations omitted).
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That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from
Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself.
.. [W]hile Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the
States may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates
an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable
but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the
federal patent laws.370
From this statement of the governing principles, the Court's conclusion that
the antidirect molding statute was unconstitutional is a natural progression in
reasoning:
It is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of creating
substantial property rights in an intellectual creation than to eliminate
the most efficient method for its exploitation. Sears and Compco
protect more than the right of the public to contemplate the abstract
beauty of an otherwise unprotected intellectual creation-they assure
its efficient reduction to practice and sale in the marketplace.371
372
Although the reasoning in Bonito Boats may be "frail and incomplete,"
the unanimous opinion defines the contours of the preemptive sweep of federal
law as applied to the misappropriation doctrine. Nonetheless, within the limits
of the permissible scope exist viable causes of action.373
Perhaps the surest approach to avoiding preemption is to employ Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act since Sears-Compco addressed preemption of state
protection and both that line of cases and Section 301 exempt federal
protection.374

370. Id. The Court reviewed its subsequent decisions in Kewanee, noting that the
common nature of the subject matter of patents and trade secrets was not deemed in
conflict. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155.

371. Id. at 164. The Court reiterated its holding in Sears permitting states to require
labeling that prevents source confusion. Id. at 985.
372. John S. Wiley Jr., Bonito Boats: Uninformed But Mandatory Innovation

Policy, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 283, 294.
373. These principles, as well as a statutory provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994),
provide for the same result under copyright law. See, e.g., Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
374.

GREGORY J. BATrERSBY

& CHARLES W. GRIMES,

THE LAW OF

MERCHANDISING AND CHARACTER LICENSING § 12.02[4][a], at 12-25 (1987).
The DMCA, see supra note 4, contains, in Title V, the Vessel Hull Design
Protection Act (hereinafter VHDPA) which is to be codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32.
The VHDPA provides for a ten year period of protection for eligible designs and accords
to the owner of a protected design a set of exclusive rights, including the right of
manufacture or sale. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998).
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V. COMMON LAW MISAPPROPRIATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA

A. Introduction
Misappropriation in the digital era is divisible into two sets of issues: the
37 6
technological dimension 75 and the legal response to evolving technology.
In turn, these responses have begun to shape business models in this rapidly
evolving environment.377 The informational function served by the patent
system, for example, is also an element requiring consideration in the evolution
of misappropriation law.

375. The technological dimension revolves around the rapid dissemination of
works and, in turn, has led to different perceptions of the appropriateness of protection.
As the NII Report reflected: "Others assert that technological advances justify reduced
protection. Since computer networks now make unauthorized... uses of protected
works so incredibly easy, it is argued, the law should legitimize those uses or face
widespread flouting. This argument is not valid. Technology makes many things
possible... [including unlawful acts.] Simply because a thing is possible does not mean
that it should be condoned." NII, supra note 6, at 14-15.

376. See Recording Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). These two elements were present in this recent case in
which the recording industry challenged the sale of a device for storing and replaying
sound recordings downloaded from a computer hard drive using a storage compression
technology; the compression technology, MPEG I Layer 3, or MP3, compresses files by
a 10:1 ratio. Id. at 625. The device has provisions for a removable memory card which
permits additional storage, or transfer of the recordings stored on the card to another
identical device. Id. In denying a preliminary injunction, the district court found no
irreparable harm under the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
Importantly, the court found that "because the [device] is capable of recording legitimate
digital music, an injunction would deprive the public of a device with significant
beneficial uses." Id.at 633. In affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction, the Ninth
Circuit observed that "the Rio's operation is entirely consistent with the Act's main
purpose-the facilitation of personal use." Recording Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
377. See NII, supra note 6, at 15. See generally Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware:
Contract and Copyright in the DigitalAge, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025 (1998). The
complexity presented by attempting to identify the nature of Internet companies borders
on chaotic; any perception is necessarily incomplete but one characterization, based online bookseller, Amazon.com emphasized intangibles: "In fact, the more you look at an
Internet phenomenon like Amazon.com, the more central the stock price seems to the
whole enterprise. It's as if the stock price is the business model ....

It is also an

enormous branding and P.R. engine, and it's central to the long-term strategy. By the
same token, it seems that if the stock were to crater, it would all unravel in a heartbeat."
Peter de Jonge, Riding the Wild, Perilous Water ofAmazon.com, N.Y. TIMES, March 14,
1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
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Only a good analysis of the philosophies underlying these two
economic functions [in patent and trademark law], and their
confrontation in the law against slavish imitation, can help to dissolve
the uncertainties surrounding the legal standpoints on this important
part of the law of unfair competition.37
The Restatement of UnfairCompetition37 9 perceived misappropriation as an
unwise doctrine: "[tihe better approach, and the one most likely to achieve an
appropriate balance between competing interests, does not recognize a residual
common law tort of misappropriation."38
B. The DigitalEra
A Commerce Department study on the digital era, "The Emerging Digital
Economy,, 381 observed that the accelerating nature of the adoption of digital
technology is such that the "digital revolution is happening much more quickly
[than the adoption of the key technologies which marked the Industrial
Revolution]. The harnessing of light for nearly instantaneous communications
and the ability to use microscopic circuits to process and store huge amounts of
information are enabling this current economic transformation." The Copyright
Office's study on the future of the Intemet, "Project Looking Forward:
Sketching the Future of Copyright in a Networked World[,] 382 cautioned against
forecasting the importance of copyright protection: "We should not be
optimistic, however, about our ability to foresee the future evolution of either
technology or new business models, especially those that relate to the Intemet:
we were not too good about 3predicting
the rise of the Internet and the World
83
Wide Web in the first place.
The digital era presents a special challenge for intellectual property
protection, for the adaptation of commercial dimensions ofproducts particularly
vulnerable to appropriation because of their digital nature, and for the legal
framework which protects such digitally embedded products. Central to the

378. PETER J. KAUFMANN, PASSING OFF AND MISAPPROPRIATION 82-83 (1986).
379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b (1995).

380. See generally Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a
Competitive Norm ofIntellectual PropertyLaw, 75 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1991).

381. See DEP'TOF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 3 (1998) (visited
Nov. 21, 1999) <www.ecommerce.gov/viewhtml.htm>.
382. I. TROTTER HARDY, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD § 5.1, at 155 (1998) ("A
legal rule may be implicitly based on assumptions about some underlying facts or
circumstances, even though those facts are nowhere mentioned or referred to in the rule.
When those facts or circumstances change because of technological evolution, an
argument arises that the rule should change as well.").
383. Id. at 27.
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complexity of analyzing these issues is the impact of legal protection for new
technologies. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed:
I've come as a skeptic about the idea that new developments in
technology imply the need for new laws or new rules... [since] we
know so little about the effects of current laws of intellectual property
that it is quite unrealistic to think that we would be able to know and
choose intelligently for new technology, [and] it is easier to design
legal rules that hurt the process of the development of intellectual
property than it is to design legal rules that help it."'
This observation has particular importance for misappropriation since, as
a doctrine of uncertain dimensions and unpredictable application,
misappropriation as applied to the digital era has a high degree of uncertainty
associated with its application. From a commercial standpoint, digitally
embedded works may become a means of delivering merchandise to customers
replacing a physical medium such as a compact disc. In turn, this has presented
opportunities for more immediate and inexpensive fulfillment, while at the same
time possibly facilitating copying.3"5 Several cases have particular application
to misappropriation in the digital era. In a principal case, NationalBasketball
Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.,386 the Second Circuit revisited the misappropriation
doctrine in the context of evolving information technology. Motorola sold a
pager device, known as "SportsTrax," which provided information about live
basketball games.387 The information about the games came from reporters who
watched or listened to broadcasts of the games.388 The district court upheld a
misappropriation claim, holding that "[b]y disseminating to fans the changing

384. Nearly 600 Attend Twelfth Annual National Lawyers Convention, THE
FEDERALIST PAPER,

Winter 1999, at 1.

385. Digital delivery systems, which are already used in the recording industrysee, e.g., Jon Pareles, Musicians Want a Revolution Waged on the Internet,N.Y. TIMES,
March 8, 1999, at Bi; Jon Pareles, Leading Recording Companies to Test On-Line
Digital Sales, N.Y. TIMEs, February 9, 1999, at C12-may also shortly be used in the
motion picture industry-see, e.g., James Stermgold, A Preview of ComingAttractions:
Digital Protectors Could Bring Drastic Changes to Movie Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
February 22, 1999, at Cl-and, in turn, have lead to efforts to develop technological
means to prevent unauthorized copying. See Rob Fixmer, CompaniesAgree on Planfor
Digital Watermarks, N.Y. TIMES, February 17, 1999, at C2; John Markoff, Sony to
Propose a Methodfor ProtectingDigitalMusic, N.Y. TIMEs, February 25, 1999, at C6.
386. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
387. Id. at 843.

388. Id. "What is at stake [involving the application of the misappropriation
doctrine] is nothing less than the ability of these 'new media' to fulfill their much
anticipated role in providing the modem public with a faster, broader array of
information products and technology than has ever previously been deemed possible."
Note, Nothing But Internet, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1158 (1997).
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scores and leads and other information on a real-time basis, defendants have
appropriated the essence of NBA's most valuable property-the excitement and
entertainment of a game in progress. 389
The "hot news" exception,390 which the Second Circuit identified as
surviving preemption, requires that:
(i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or
expense; (ii) the value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii)
the defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding on the
plaintiff's costly efforts to generate or collect it; (iv) the defendant's
use of the information is in direct competition with a product or
service offered by the plaintiff; (v) the ability of other parties to freeride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to
produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened.39'
Separately, the claim required an "extra-element" to survive preemption. 92 In
its analysis of the application of these requirements to Motorola's pager service,
the Second Circuit was unable to demonstrate that free riding occurred since the
gathering of game information, and its transmission, did not equal free riding on
the NBA's own reporting service.393 Central to the Second Circuit's reasoning
was the realization that the NBA's primary products and revenue sources stem
from live attendance at basketball games and licensing broadcasts, neither of

389. National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939
F. Supp. 1071, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. National

Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
390. The "hot news" doctrine originated in InternationalNews Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245-46 (1918). The holding of InternationalNews Service

authorized protection until Associated Press was able to conduct its normal distribution
of news stories; that right to commercialize its product was the "quasi-property"
protected by the Court. Id. at 242. More contemporary cases frame the "hot news"
doctrine in a similar manner. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv.,

808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he 'hot' news doctrine is concerned
with the copying and publication of information gathered by another before he has been
able to utilize his competitive edge"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
39 1. NationalBasketballAss 'n, 105 F.3d at 845 (internal citations omitted).
392. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text (discussing preemption and
the "extra element" text). In NationalBasketballAss'nthe Second Circuit found that the
time sensitive value of the information, the defendant's free riding, and the potential
threat to the "very existence" of the service produced by the plaintiff provided the
requisite "extra elements." NationalBasketballAss'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
393. An enhanced version of the NBA's reporting service, called "Gamestats"
would directly compete with the Motorola service. Id. at 853. Such a service may also
enjoy enhanced cost savings by being shared across a variety of products. Id. at 854 n.9.
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which were being appropriated by the Motorola service.394 While Motorola did
transmit data about live games, the Second Circuit perceived a significant
difference in that
The collection and retransmission of strictly factual material about the
games is a different product: e.g., box-scores in newspapers,
summaries of statistics on television sports news, and real-time facts
to be transmitted to pagers. In our view, the NBA has failed to show
any competitive effect whatsoever from SportsTrax on [live
attendance or broadcasts] and a lack of any free-riding by SportsTrax
on the third [product, involving factual transmissions].395
This formulation of the misappropriation doctrine is at odds with the
expansive development of the doctrine in earlier cases. The Second Circuit
found no compelling authority for permitting misappropriation beyond "hot
news": 396 "!NS [InternationalNews Service] is not about ethics; it is about the
protection of property rights in time-sensitive information so that the information
will be made available to the public by profit seeking entrepreneurs. 397
While National BasketballAss'n arose in a factually specific context 311
involving the real-time distribution of sports scores from on-going NBA games,
the case raises issues that will recur in other contexts as the distribution of
information having value becomes increasingly common. As such, National
Basketball Ass'

provides a means of predicting the future protection of

intellectual property in an era of rapidly evolving technology. The case gives
insight into what degree of legal protection will provide inducements to create,
while at the same time providing public access to information. National
BasketballAss'n further provides a limited revival of a doctrine battered nearly
from its inception: common law misappropriation of publicly-disclosed trade
values. '99

394. Id. at 853-54.
395. Id. at 853.

396. This aspect ofNationalBasketballAss 'n is important because "it goes fiurther
than any other previously reported case by indicating that intellectual property law will
not protect a plaintiff's remuneration if the plaintiffs incentives are not thereby
protected." Monica Y. Youn, Note, Neither IntellectualNor Property, 107 YALE L..
267, 268 (1997).
397. NationalBasketballAss'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
398. See infra notes 386-97 and accompanying text.
399. Several other cases are more expansive in defining the evolving dimensions
of misappropriation. In United States Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game
Call, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), animal sounds recorded prior to 1972
when federal protection became available, that were used by hunters to attract game into
range were the basis for a misappropriation claim under Texas law. The Texas Court of
Appeals, deemed that the misappropriation claim was both the basis for relief and an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/3
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VI. CONCLUSION

Misappropriation has been, for more than three quarters of a century, an
intriguing doctrine of unfair competition law and one which caused the particular
concerns of state law to confront the overriding dictates of federal law. As a
doctrine arising from business conduct resulting from special circumstances, and
facilitated by the technology of the era, misappropriation, as defined by its
common law development and by its statutory analogs, is a cause of action with
particular appeal in defining issues already being confronted due to the rapid
adoption of digital ("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are to remove existing knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to

materials already available."); technology.
The Second Circuit's decision in NationalBasketballAssnn represents only
the beginning of what will be a long evolution of common law doctrines
supporting constitutional restrictions on the common law doctrine of
misappropriation, while at the same time supporting the objectives embedded in
the doctrine. The narrow limits imposed by the case suggest that its reasoning
will be followed only to the extent that subsequent courts believe that overriding
concerns of federal preemption require a narrowing of this enduring common
law response to the inherent tensions of the competitive process.

award which included punitive damages. The Court expressly rejected a contention that
Texas law limited misappropriation relief to matters which contained "time value." Id.

at 216-17. See also U.S. Golf Ass'n v. Arroyo Software Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 716
(App. 1999) (holding a misappropriation claim based on the use of a golf handicapping
formula was not preempted because a formula is not within the subject matter of
copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994), and is accordingly not preempted by 17 U.S.C. §
301(b) (1994) which preserves common law claims for works "not within the subject
matter of copyright"). Nor did the U.S. Golf court find the holding in U.S. GolfAss'n v.
St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1038 (3d Cir. 1984), persuasive, in part because
California law, unlike New Jersey law, does not require proof of direct competition. Id.

at 717. The Third Circuit had declined to extend misappropriation protection to the
handicapping formula because it deemed it "inconceivable" that the plaintiff would not

have sufficient incentive to maintain its handicapping formula. Id.
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